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Chapter 1
Efficient Asset Trade - A
Model with Asymmetric
Information and Asymmetric
Liquidity Needs
1.1 Introduction
Do asset prices efficiently guide the allocation of investment (Hayek, 1945)?
The manager of a firm takes into account his firm’s asset price on the
secondary stock market when taking an investment decision. The manager
takes into account his firm’s asset price, because there are traders on the
stock market who have, in addition to the manager’s information, informa-
tion about the perspective of the investment opportunity which are displayed
in the stock price.1 The information may concern appropriate capital cost
of the investment, the competitive situation of the firm after the invest-
ment or future demand of the economy. Consider the following example
for superior information about competitiveness with the two following char-
1Empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that corporate investment is guided by
the stock price is provided by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2004); Luo (2005) and Chen,
Goldstein and Jiang (2007).
1
acteristics. Innovation is incremental rather than radical and the firm is
relatively small. A public firm, listed in a minor stock index, develops a new
version of its product. This firm is not big enough yet to have a marketing
department providing a worldwide market analysis for the new version of the
product. A big investment firm has the facilities to perform a such market
analysis and evaluate the future demand. Clearly, with a radical innovation,
also the investment firm would not be able to evaluate future demand.
What is the nature of traders who have the kind of aforementioned in-
formation? These are large traders. Three examples of Financial Markets’
traders for which large traders are a prominent phenomenon nowadays are
Investment Management Firms, Hedge Funds and Mutual Funds. Being
large has three major features. First, a large trader has the capacity to
acquire information. He employs regional or topical specialists in order to
evaluate the prospective demand and the prospective competitive situation.
Moreover, banks often have business ties to public firms so that they are
able to evaluate the firm’s financial situation in comparison to its competi-
tors. Second, a large trader’s transaction moves the market.2 And third, a
large trader is likely to have different liquidity needs with respect to small
traders.
Liquidity needs are reflected by borrowing rates. In the US, there are
different borrowing rates. There is a small number of traders who have access
to the FED Funds Rate. Those are the Primary Dealers3 who are eligible to
engage in repurchase agreements (REPOs) with the FED. Essentially, the
FED provides a collateralized debt to the Primary Dealers. Currently, there
are 22 Primary Dealers. Among them only the biggest financial institutions
in the world in terms of assets under management (AUM). For example
BNP Paribas, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Nomura and UBS. Most of the other investment
institutions face the Bank Prime Loan Rate which is offered by banks to
2These first two aspects are also standard assumptions in the literature following Kyle
(1985).
3The list of current and historic Primary Dealers can be found on New York’s Fed
website: http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pridealers_current.html\#tabs-1.
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their most favorable clients. The Bank Prime Loan Rate and the FED
Funds Rate are depicted in figure 1.1. There is a systematic difference
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Figure 1.1: Asymmetric borrowing rates
in the borrowing rate of the Primary Dealers, i.e. the FED Funds Rate,
and the borrowing rate of most of the other Financial Market participants,
i.e. the Bank Prime Loan Rate. Facing a relatively high borrowing rate,
Financial Market participants who hold assets can, instead of borrowing,
sell their assets. Since Primary Dealers face a lower borrowing rate, they
can borrow money and buy the assets from the other Financial Market
participants. The latter are willing to decrease the asset price, at which
they sell, proportionally to their liquidity needs. This creates a motive for
trade.
There is a growing literature studying the question of whether asset
prices efficiently guide the allocation of investment. The debate in the lit-
erature evolves around the question, whether asset prices reveal informed
traders’ information about the investment opportunity.
This paper introduces asymmetric liquidity needs between the informed
trader and the uninformed traders which allows to provide a complete wel-
fare analysis. From Tirole (1982) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), it is
well understood that there is no trade if traders have asymmetric informa-
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tion only. Trade requires a second asymmetry. Asymmetric liquidity needs
are one natural asymmetry serving the purpose of generating trade. In a
related paper, Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2014) consider fast and slow
traders which is another asymmetry in the context of High Frequency Trad-
ing. Under asymmetric liquidity needs, I provide conditions under which
information revelation yields greater welfare than no revelation. This is
the intuitive result. Laffont and Maskin (1990) however show that if the
variance of the investment opportunity is sufficiently small, welfare without
information revelation is larger. Their result is driven by the fact that pri-
vate information has no social value. By adding the firm with its investment
opportunity, I give social value to private information. Still, no information
revelation can yield greater welfare since welfare depends on both informa-
tion and the amount of trade. Since the expected amount of trade is larger
with no information revelation, welfare can be larger if the gain from infor-
mation revelation is sufficiently small, i.e. the variance of the investment
opportunity is small.
The model considered goes as follows. There is a manager of a firm
facing an investment opportunity with uncertain outcome, either good or
bad. When the manager decides upon the investment, abstracting from any
moral-hazard issues4, he takes into account the firm’s asset price on the
secondary stock market, i.e. the manager updates his prior beliefs about
the outcome of the investment opportunity. He does so because there is an
informed trader who has information about the perspective of the investment
opportunity. Depending on whether the firm’s asset price (does not) reveals
available information, the manager takes an (in)efficient investment decision.
In the case in which the asset price does not reveal information, the manager
over invests (under invests) in the bad (good) state. Information revelation,
and thus the inefficiency, is determined by the interaction of asset traders.
Asset trade takes place between an informed trader and uninformed
traders in a model a` la Laffont and Maskin (1990). The informed trader
4Moral hazard of the firm manager would create an additional inefficiency. Essentially,
the investment level would be further decreased due to shirking of the manager. This
would change the level of investment but not the qualitative results of the paper.
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observes either good or bad information about the investment prospect of
the firm. The uninformed traders are holding the assets of the firm, i.e. they
are the owners of the firm. The uninformed traders are a large amount of
stock holders with little asset holding each. This is to say they do not com-
municate directly with the management. Furthermore, the management has
no superior information to the uninformed traders so that even if there was
communication between owner and management, the owner would not learn
any inside information. By observing the demand of the informed trader,
the uninformed traders update their beliefs about the quality of the asset
and decide whether to sell5. Notice, the informed trader takes into account
the effect of his purchase on the asset price. Notice however that the market
clearing mechanism is not explicitly modeled. Instead, P satisfies the break
even condition of the uninformed trader. And B is determined such that it
satisfies incentive compatibility and participation of the informed trader.
There are two types of pure strategy equilibria. First, a separating equi-
librium in which the informed trader reveals private information by demand-
ing a larger quantity when he has good information than when he has bad
information6. The equilibrium price hence is either high or low. In order
for trade to take place, in either state, the uninformed trader has to be
more liquidity constrained than the informed trader. The equilibrium asset
prices depends on the liquidity needs of the uninformed trader. Or differ-
ently, when the uninformed trader needs liquidity, he is willing to decrease
the price at which he sells the assets proportional to his borrowing costs.
Trade occurs for an infinitesimal small difference in liquidity needs. Since
the asset prices reveal available information, the firm’s manager takes an
efficient investment decision and therefore the firm value is maximized given
the observed information.
Second, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the informed trader
does not reveal private information by demanding the same quantity no
matter whether he has good or bad information. Then the uninformed trader
5The same results carry through if markets are anonymous and risk-neutral, competi-
tive market makers clear demand and supply.
6Either quantity is observed by the uninformed trader.
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cannot infer information from the informed trader’s demand and hence stays
with the prior beliefs. In the pooling equilibrium, the asset price reflects the
expected value of the asset which is below the prospect of the informed
trader with good information and above the prospect of the informed trader
with bad information. Just like in the separating equilibrium, also in the
pooling equilibrium, the asset price depend on the liquidity needs of the
uninformed trader. Since for the informed trader with good information the
pooling equilibrium price is relatively low in comparison to his prospect, he
is always willing to buy. The informed trader with bad information however
is only willing to buy if the negative difference between his prospect and the
expected value of the asset is outweighed by the uninformed trader’s liquidity
needs. In other words, in the pooling equilibrium, the uninformed trader
needs to be more liquidity constrained than in the separating equilibrium
for trade to take place between the uninformed trader and the informed
trader with bad information. With an uninformative asset price, the firm’s
manager over (under) invests in case of bad (good) information. Given
available information, the inefficient investment leads to a lower firm value
than in the separating equilibrium.
I show that separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium co-exist if the
variance of the investment’s outcome is relatively small and the difference in
liquidity needs is intermediate. More generally, this characterizes a situation
in which gains from asset trade for the informed trader are moderate. The
welfare analysis is carried out for the set of parameters for which separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium co-exist.
Welfare is defined as the ex-ante profit of the informed trader and the
uninformed trader. The profits of the traders increase in the quantity traded
and for the ones owning assets of the firm, in information revelation. Since
traders are risk neutral, there exist equilibria in which all possible assets
are traded, i.e. there are corner solutions. In the pooling equilibria the
informed trader purchases always the maximal amount of assets. In order
for a separating equilibrium to exist, the informed trader with bad infor-
mation has to trade less than the informed trader with good information.
Therefore, in expectation, the pooling equilibrium exhibits more trade than
6
the separting equilibrium. Therefore, there is a trade-off for the traders be-
tween quantities traded and information revelation. In fact, an equilibrium
in which information is not revealed (pooling equilibrium) can yield higher
welfare if the gain from information revelation (separating equilibrium) is
small. The gain from information revelation is small if the variance of the
prospective outcome of the investment is small. The welfare analysis there-
fore provides conditions on the quantities traded and the variance of the
prospective outcome of the investment.
The allocational role of asset prices (=feedback effect) has been studied
in papers by Leland (1992), Dow and Gorton (1997), Subrahmanyam and
Titman (2001), Dow and Rahi (2003), Goldstein and Guembel (2008) and
Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2014).7 These papers have in common, asset
prices do not always reveal available information and hence lead to inefficient
investment allocation. There are two interrelated drawbacks of these kind
of models.
First, the non-informativeness of the prices is exogenous. The reason
why prices are non-informative is that there are traders aside the informed
trader and the asset owners, who are trading for non-asset related motives.
Since uninformed traders cannot distinguish between information trading
and other non-asset related trading, the asset price not only reflects asset
related information but also other non-asset related information. In Gold-
stein and Guembel (2008), Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Edmans,
Goldstein and Jiang (2014) these are passive noise traders. In Dow and Rahi
(2003), though active, they are uninformed traders buying or selling for ex-
ogenous endowment shocks. The fact that prices do not reveal available
information in these models is exogenous and thus the inefficient investment
allocation. As such, noise traders are just a technical issue. In fact, the price
in the pooling equilibrium resembles the price in an equilibrium with a lot
of noise trading and the prices in the separating equilibrium approximately
occur in models with noise trading when there is almost no noise trading. In
7The feedback effect literature differs from e.g. Medrano and Vives (2004) insofar as
asset trade affects the investment level, whereas in Medrano and Vives (2004) investment
takes place before private information is observed and assets are traded.
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the noise trader models however, there cannot exist an equilibrium exhibit-
ing full information revelation unless, on top of asymmetric information,
there is an additional asymmetry between informed trader and uninformed
traders. The never full information revelation result is somewhat artificial.
Models a` la Laffont and Maskin (1990) exhibit equilibria in which both infor-
mation revelation and no information revelation occur. The major drawback
of noise traders is that their preferences are not specified and hence welfare
cannot be analyzed. Although for a slightly different setup, Medrano and
Vives (2004) show that welfare analysis with noise traders is often mislead.
Which brings about the second drawback. The overall welfare analysis
is unclear and therefore it is not possible to evaluate the effect of asset
prices on the real economy. Goldstein and Guembel (2008), Subrahmanyam
and Titman (2001) and Edmans, Goldstein and Jiang (2014) refrain from
a welfare analysis altogether since the motive, and hence the profit, of the
noise traders is, at best, unclear. Indeed, most of the time, noise traders
make negative profits. Dow and Rahi (2003) provide an incomplete welfare
analysis insofar as they cannot define whether the informed trader’s profit
from non-information revelation outweighs the loss of the uninformed trader.
Considering a model with perfect competition among informed traders
such as Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) and Dow and Rahi (2003) but
without noise trading, would always yield information revelation through
asset prices (Grossman and Stiglitz (1980)) and hence will never create an
inefficiency. Therefore, models with perfect competition among informed
traders should not be subject of concern in discussions of inefficient Financial
Markets. A model which creates endogenous inefficiency is a model with
a monopolistically informed trader8. Laffont and Maskin (1990) propose
such a model. Differently from the aforementioned literature, the model of
Laffont and Maskin (1990) exhibits an equilibrium in which information is
not revealed in the price by choice of the traders. Laffont and Maskin (1990)
do not study however which effect the asset price has on real investment
decisions. This paper builds on Laffont and Maskin (1990) and adds a
8Another model creating endogenous inefficiencies considers career concerns of invest-
ment managers (Dasgupta and Prat (2006)).
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welfare analysis which incorporates both, the secondary financial market
and the real economy.
I suggest a model which alleviates the two aforementioned issues in the
existing literature, i.e. a model in which (i) the inefficiency is driven by
preferences and (ii) a complete welfare analysis is carried out.
In the remainder of this paper, section 1.2 presents the model set-up. In
section 1.3, I derive both separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.
The welfare comparison between the two types of equilibria is carried out in
section 1.4 and section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model has five dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and a firm whose stock is traded in
the financial market. There are two types of risk-neutral traders i ∈ {I, U}.
An informed trader I and uniformed traders U of measure E. Each of the
uninformed traders holds one unit of the entire stock of the asset. In line
with their little asset holding, the uninformed traders are assumed to be in
perfect competition and thus price takers. Throughout the model they are
treated as one representative agent with an asset holding of E. Informed
trader and uninformed trader have different liquidity needs. Liquidity needs
are modeled with discount factors 1 > δi > 0. The higher δi the less liquidity
constrained is the trader. Assume, the informed trader is less liquidity
constrained than the uninformed trader, δI > δU . This is in line with the
stylized fact depicted in figure 1.1. The uninformed traders own assets of a
firm which faces an uncertain investment opportunity V ∈ {VH , VL}.
In t = 0, the informed trader observes private information ω ∈ {H,L}
about the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunity. With proba-
bility 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the firm’s investment opportunity yields a payoff VH and
with probability 1 − β, VL. Where VH > VL. Alternatively, the informed
trader can invest in a riskless asset of which the revenue is normalized to 0,
i.e. both the riskless rate and the revenue of the asset are 0. In t = 1, the in-
formed trader decides to buy E ≥ B ≥ 0 assets from the uninformed trader.
In t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the informed trader’s demand and
9
decides to sell or to keep the assets. In t = 3, the firm observes the asset
price P and takes its investment decision k. Eventually, in t = 4, either the
high payoff VH or the low payoff VL realizes. The timeline is depicted in
figure 1.2
 
𝑡 
𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 0 
Informed trader 
observes 𝜔 
Informed trader 
buys 𝐵 assets 
Uninformed trader 
observes 𝐵 and 
decides to sell at 𝑃 
Manager observes 
𝑃 and decides to 
invest 𝑘 𝑉𝐻 or 𝑉𝐿 realizes 
Figure 1.2: Timeline
After observing the quantity chosen by the informed trader B, the un-
informed trader updates the prior belief and form the conditional belief
q = Pr(VH |B). Similarly the firm’s manager updates his belief about the
quality of the investment after observing the asset price P and form the
conditional belief r = Pr(VH |P ). Since there is not other private or public
information besides the information about the outcome of the investment
opportunity, in equilibrium, the price will reflect the demand of the informed
trader only, and thus P conveys the same information as B. Therefore I can
write r = q. For ease of notation, beliefs of both, the uninformed trader and
the firm will be denoted by q = Pr(VH |B).
The firm value F increases in investment k at a decreasing rate ∀k ≤ k∗,
where k∗ is the optimal investment level. c is a fixed marginal cost of
investment. The firm’s manager maximizes the firm value by choosing the
investment level k given the price he observes on the stock market. The
firm value increases in the prospect of the investment Vω. The manager’s
objective function is written as
F (k) = kVω − c
2
k2 (1.1)
so that the expected firm value becomes
E(F |B) = kE(VH |B)− c
2
k2. (1.2)
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The firm value function is adopted from Dow and Rahi (2003). The con-
cavity of the firm value function in k implies that private information has
social value even ex-ante. This will become clearer once the optimal k for
both types of equilibria is derived. I postpone this discussion therefore to
section 1.3.
After observing information in t = 0, the informed trader decides to buy
a quantity B at a price P in period t = 1. When choosing B, the informed
trader not only conditions on his private information ω but also takes into
account the signal his choice is sending to the uninformed trader and the
firm. In t = 4, when the investment value Vω realizes and thus the firm
value F , the informed trader cashes in on the assets bought. The informed
trader evaluates the cash-flow from the perspective of period t = 1, i.e.
when deciding on the purchase. The informed trader discounts the payoff
of period t = 4 by δI . By how much he discounts depends on how liquidity
constrained he is. If, for example, the borrowing rate is zero, the informed
trader is indifferent between a payoff today and tomorrow such that δI = 1.
The higher the borrowing rate, the lower the discount factor and the less
willing is the informed trader to give up a payoff today for a payoff tomorrow.
The informed trader’s cash flow from buying the risky asset at date t = 1 is
UI(Vω, k) = −PB + δIBF. (1.3)
Instead of buying the risky asset, the informed trader can also buy the
riskless asset and obtain 0 payoff.
In t = 2, when selling an amount B of the total endowment E, the
uninformed trader receives a revenue PB from the sale. In t = 4, after
the realization of the investment value, just like the informed trader, the
uninformed trader cashes in on the assets held. Evaluating the cash-flow
from period t = 1, the uninformed trader discounts the payoff from period
t = 4 by δU . The uninformed trader’s net present value (NPV) at t = 2 is
UU (B, k) = PB + δU (E −B)F. (1.4)
11
In order to state the expected value of the uninformed trader’s NPV, I have
to specify the beliefs. Therefore, the introduction of the expected NPV is
deferred to section 1.3. Instead of selling assets, the uninformed trader can
also keep all the assets, i.e. B = 0, and receive a NPV at time t = 2 of
δUEF .
1.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The informed trader strategy is a mapping B : {Vω} → <+0 that prescribes
a quantity B(Vω) on the basis of the trader’s private information ω. The
uninformed trader strategy is a mapping P : <+0 → <+0 . The firm manager
strategy is a mapping k : <+0 → <+0 . Conditional beliefs for the unin-
formed trader and the firm manager are represented by a mapping that
associates to each quantity B a probability function Pr(·|B) on {VH , VL},
where Pr(Vω|B) is the probability that the uninformed trader and the firm
manager attach to a value Vω given quantity B.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined by a triple of strategies
(B(·), P (·), k(·)) and a family of conditional beliefs Pr(·|·) such that (i) for all
B in the range of B(·), Pr(·|B) is the conditional probability of Vω obtained
by updating the prior (β, (1 − β)), using B(·) in Bayesian fashion; (ii) for
all B(·), P argmaxP ∈ E(UU (·)), (iii) for all B(·) k∗ ∈ argmaxk E(F |B)
and (iv) for all ω B ∈ argmaxB E(UI(·)). Condition (i) stipulates that
the uninformed trader and the firm’s manager have rational expectations.
Conditions (ii) to (iv) require that traders be optimizing. In particular, they
imply participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
Market clearing takes place through the adjustment of the price P to
the quantity demanded B. I.e. the informed trader submits a market order.
Observing the market order, the uninformed trader, acting as a market
maker, updates the belief about the quality of the asset and sets the price.
In equilibrium, there has to be a unique price-quantity bundle {P,B}.
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1.3.1 Separating equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, the informed trader buys different quantities in
either state. Therefore, the purchase reveals private information. Suppose,
the informed trader buys BH after observing H and BL after observing L,
then I invoke the uninformed trader’s and the firm’s conditional beliefs as:
q = Pr(H|B) =

1 if B = BH
0 if B = BL
1 B′ 6= BH ∧B′ 6= BL
. (1.5)
The conditional beliefs imply that the uninformed trader and the firm up-
date their priors such that if they observe BH , they are sure to face the
informed trader with good information and if they observe BL, they know
the informed trader with bad information is buying the asset. The intuition
for the off-equilibrium belief is the informed trader with good information H
wants to mimic the informed trader with bad information L in order to get a
low price9. Discontinuity of the conditional beliefs is a natural consequence
of the binomial distribution of the random variable Vω. This is different
from Laffont and Maskin (1990). They can potentially obtain continuous,
monotonic beliefs since they consider a general distribution function. I will
have to show that the conditional beliefs satisfy incentive compatibility of
the informed trader and ensure participation of the uninformed trader in
equilibrium.
Observing the asset price P from t = 2, the firm’s manager forms the
belief q. Since asset trade reveals information, there will be two prices Pω
depending on the private information or, equivalently, the demand from the
informed trader. In t = 3, based on the beliefs, the firm takes the decision
on the investment level k in order to maximize the conditional, expected
firm value
maxkE(F |B) = Fω = k(qVH + (1− q)VL)− c
2
k2. (1.6)
9The off-equilibrium beliefs stipulated here are not the only possible ones.
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Depending on the price observed, the optimal investment choice k∗ is kω =
Vω
c and therefore the firm’s equilibrium value is E(F |Bω) = Fω = V
2
ω
2c .
The uninformed trader infers the private information ω from the demand
B of the informed trader. As price taker, the uninformed trader decides
whether to sell or to retain the assets for a given price Pω. The equilibrium
price therefore has to satisfy the following participation constraint:
PωBω + δU (E −Bω)Fω ≥ δUEFω. (1.7)
Due to perfect competition, the uninformed trader breaks even. Then, the
equilibrium price is Pω = δUFω, depending on the demand observed. It
is intuitive that the uninformed trader wants to sell the asset at the price
which reflects the value of the firm discounted by his liquidity need. The
more liquidity constrained the uninformed trader, the more he is willing to
decrease the price.
The informed trader is willing to buy the risky asset if the NPV of buying
the risky asset outweighs the NPV of the riskless asset. Given the price
Pω, the informed trader’s participation constraint, depending on private
information, is
−δUFωBω + δIBωFω ≥ 0. (1.8)
No matter which information the informed trader observed, the participation
constraint is satisfied since δI ≥ δU . Since the uninformed trader can observe
the quality of the investment, the only gain from trade is the asymmetry in
liquidity needs. Namely that the uninformed trader is eager to sell assets
because of the tight liquidity constraint. Given the tight liquidity needs
of the uninformed trader, the informed trader can buy the asset relatively
cheap if he is less liquidity constrained than the uninformed trader.
In order to show that Bω is the optimal choice for the informed trader
given the observed information ω, consider the incentive compatibility con-
straints. As shown before, the informed trader faces a price Pω = δUFω
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when choosing Bω. Incentive compatibility is satisfied if
−δUFωBω + δIBωFω ≥ −δUF−ωB−ω + δIB−ωF ′ω (1.9)
where − ω 6= ω.
with F ′H =
VL
c (VH − VL2 ) and F ′L = VHc (VL − VH2 ). These are the firm
values in which the manager chooses k−ω = V−ωc although the real value
was Vω. It is straightforward to show that the ranking of the firm value is
FH > F
′
H > FL > F
′
L and F
′
L > 0 if and only if VH < 2VL. This implies
that the informed trader with information ω decreases, not only the others’
payoffs, but also his own payoff by mimicking the other type −ω.
If δU
FH
F ′L
> δI > δU and VH < 2VL (from F
′
L > 0), the off-equilibrium
payoff of the informed trader with bad information is negative for any BH .
His incentive compatibility is therefore satisfied ∀ BL > 0. The informed
trader with good information has a postive off-equilibrium payoff. He wants
to mimic the informed trader with bad information in order to obtain a
lower purchase price. Therefore restrictions on BH in comparison to BL are
required. The conditions satisfying the informed trader incentive compati-
bility if δU
FH
F ′L
> δI are summarized as follows
(−δU + δI)FH
−δUFL + δIF ′H
BH ≥ BL ≥ 0. (1.10)
In order for BL strictly different from BH , (−δU+δI)FH−δUFL+δIF ′H < 1. The latter in-
equality can be rewritten as δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI . Therfore, min{δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H , δU
FH
F ′L
} >
δI . Make the following two observations:
∂
FH−FL
FH−F ′H
∂VH
< 0 and FH−FL
FH−F ′H <
FH
F ′L
if and only if VH >
1
2(1 +
√
5)VL. This implies for increasing VH , the liq-
uidity difference δI − δU has to decrease. Intuitively, the informed trader
with good information is more inclined to mimic the low type the higher VH ,
given VL. In order for him to refrain from doing so, liquidity asymmetry has
to decrease, i.e. the gain from trading on liquidity difference decreases.
If instead δI > δU
FH
F ′L
given 2VL > VH > VL, the liquidity difference
is so large that both the informed trader with good information and the
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informed trader with bad information has an incentive to mimic the other
type. The reason for the informed trader with good information wanting to
mimic is still the lower price. The reason for the informed trader with bad
information is that the loss from facing a higher price is outweighed by the
gain from purchasing a larger quantity. The following condition, obtained
from the incentive compatibility constraints from inequality 1.9, guarantees
that neither of the two type mimics the other one,
(−δU + δI)FH
−δUFL + δIF ′H
BH > BL >
−δUFH + δIF ′L
(−δU + δI)FL B
H . (1.11)
Observe (−δU+δI)FH−δUFL+δIF ′H >
−δUFH+δIF ′L
(−δU+δI)FL so that there exists B
L > 0. Recall
that in order for the informed trader with bad information not be able
to mimic the informed trader with good information, not only the lower
bound has to be satisfied, but also the upper bound has to be smaller than
one, (−δU+δI)FH−δUFL+δIF ′H < 1. In order for a separating equilibrium with δI >
δU
FH
F ′L
to exist, FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
FH
F ′L
. If and only if 12(1 +
√
5)VL > VH > VL,
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
FH
F ′L
. Consequently, there exists a candidate separating equilibrium
if 12(1 +
√
5)VL > VH > VL and δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FH
F ′L
with trade as
specified in condition 1.11.
Besides choosing B−ω, the informed trader with private information ω
can also choose any other quantity B′ 6= Bω. In order to ensure optimality of
Bω consider also the following incentive compatibility constraints for either
type ω:
(−PH + δIFH)BH ≥ (−P ′ + δIFH)B′ ∀B′ (1.12)
(−PL + δIFL)BL ≥ (−P ′ + δIF ′L)B′ ∀B′ (1.13)
As specified by the off-equilibrium belief in equation 1.5, the uninformed
trader believes that he is facing a high type after observing B′. When
breaking even, the uninformed trader asks an off-equilibrium price P ′ =
δUFH .
After reformulating conditions 1.12 and 1.13, it is straightforward to
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show that Bω are optimal if,
BH = E (1.14)
BL ≥ max{0, −δUFH + δIF
′
L
(−δU + δI)FL E}. (1.15)
Together with condition 1.10 and 1.11, the equilibrium quantities are
given by
BH = E, (1.16)
(−δU + δI)FH
−δUFL + δIF ′H
E ≥ BL ≥ max{0, −δUFH + δIF
′
L
(−δU + δI)FL E}. (1.17)
I hereby have described a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which private
information is revealed. There exist multiple separating equilibria, depend-
ing on both, the difference in liquidity needs and the range of admissible
BL. This summarizes the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Separating equilibrium. There exist separating equilibria
with price Pω = δUFω, ω ∈ {H,L} and quantities as specified in 1.16 and
1.17 if
 δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU and VH >
1
2(1 +
√
5)VL or
 δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FH
F ′L
and 12(1 +
√
5)VL > VH > VL.
1.3.2 Pooling equilibrium
Next, I characterize the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists.
In a pooling equilibrium, the informed trader buys identical quantities in
either state ω. Therefore, the uninformed trader and the firm cannot infer
the informed trader’s private information. Suppose the informed trader
chooses BP in either state, then the uninformed trader’s and the firm’s
conditional belief is equal to their priors. If they observe and B′ 6= BP , their
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conditional belief implies that the informed trader has good information:
q = Pr(H|B) =
β if B = BP1 B′ 6= BP . (1.18)
The intuition for the belief ”off-equilibrium” is, that the informed trader
with good information is more inclined to deviate from the equilibrium quan-
tity BP since the price in the pooling equilibrium is relatively low. These
conditional beliefs will have to satisfy the uninformed trader’s participation
constraint as well as the informed trader’s incentive compatibility.
Observing the asset price in t = 2, the firm’s manager updates the belief
according to equation 1.18. Given these beliefs, he takes the investment
decision k in order to maximize the conditional, expected firm value in the
pooling equilibrium FP :
maxkE(F |B) = FP = k(βVH + (1− β)VL)− c
2
k2. (1.19)
Denote (βVH+(1−β)VL) = E(V ). The optimal choice of the firm’s manager
in the pooling equilibrium is kP = E(V )c so that the firm value becomes
FP =
E(V )2
2c . Now, I can readily comment on the social value of private
information. Therefore, observe that βFH + (1− β)FL > FP for any β > 0.
It is this relationship which gives social value to private information even
from an ex-ante perspective. The concave firm value function is driving this
relationship. If it was linear instead, the expected value of the firm in a
separating equilibrium would be identical to the expected value of the firm
in the pooling equilibrium.
After observing the informed trader’s demand, the uninformed trader
forms the beliefs given in equation 1.18. Then he decides whether to sell or
to keep the asset. Since the informed trader purchases the same quantity
BP regardless of the state, there is just one price P for both states. The
18
uninformed trader’s participation constraint becomes
β(PBP + δU (E −BP )FP ) + (1− β)(PBP + δU (E −BP )FP ) ≥
δUE(βFP + (1− β)FP ). (1.20)
Recall, the uninformed trader is price taker and in competition for the sale
with the other small, uninformed traders. The equilibrium price P has to
satisfy inequality 1.20 when it is binding, i.e. the uninformed trader breaks
even. If inequality 1.20 is binding, P = δUFP .
Just like in the separating equilibrium, the price decreases the more
liquidity constrained the uninformed trader. For a given δU and β > 0, the
equilibrium price in the pooling equilibrium lays between the prices in the
separating equilibrium in the good state and in the bad state, PH > P > PL.
The price in the pooling equilibrium does not reflect available information
and consequently will lead to the inefficient level of investment. It does not
reflect available information because the informed trader chooses the same
demand in either state.
Given the price P = δUFP , the informed trader decides whether to buy
BP of the risky asset or the riskless asset which gives a return of 0. His
participation constraints in either state is
−δUFPBP + δIBPFωP ≥ 0. (1.21)
The firm value from the perspective of the informed trader takes into account
the investment decision of the manager, kP = E(V )c , given the privately
observed information ω. Therefore, the firm value from the informed trader’s
perspective are FωP =
E(V )
c (Vω−E(V )2 ) with FLP > 0 if and only if VLVH−VL > β.
Observe, FHP > FP > F
L
P . Implying that the informed trader with good
information faces a higher return from the risky asset than the informed
trader with bad information, given the uninformed choice of the manager.
The participation constraint for the informed trader with bad information
is more binding. In fact, if ω = L, the left hand side of the inequality is
smaller than if ω = H. Solving the participation of the informed trader with
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bad information for δI yields for any B
P ≥ 0: δI ≥ δU FPFLP . Since
FP
FLP
> 1, the
informed trader needs to be considerably less liquidity constrained than the
uninformed trader, and in particular less than in the separating equilibrium
where participation was ensured if δI > δU . Observe that
FP
FLP
increases in
β. That is the more likely the good outcome, the larger needs to be the
difference between the informed trader’s liquidity needs and the uninformed
trader’s liquidity needs.
The mechanism behind the equilibrium condition δI ≥ δU FPFLP is driven
by the prospect of the informed trader with bad information, δIF
L
P . Given
bad information, the informed trader does not want to buy the asset at a
high price. For a given δU , the pooling equilibrium price P = δUFP is high
relative to the prospect. So the informed trader is only willing to buy if
the uninformed trader is sufficiently liquidity constrained, i.e. δU is small
relative to δI .
It is left to be shown that choosing BP in either state is optimal over
choosing any other quantity B′. So far, I have only characterized the un-
informed trader’s and the firm’s best response after they observe BP , i.e.
the price P = δUFP and the optimal investment level k
P = E(V )2c . So what
happens if uninformed trader and firm respectively observe B′? Consider
first the firm. The belief invoked by equality 1.18 implies that if B′, or
equivalently P ′, is observed, the firm believes that the informed trader has
good information and therefore chooses k′ = V
2
H
2c . Same thing for the unin-
formed trader, when observing B′, he believes, according to equality 1.18,
to face an informed trader with good information. Just like on the equi-
librium path, uninformed traders are assumed to be price takers and to be
in perfect competition. So that when they break even, the off-equilibrium
price becomes P ′ = δUFH . Now, I can study incentive compatibility. If the
informed trader chooses the equilibrium quantity BP , he is facing a price
P = δUFP . If instead he chooses the off-equilibrium quantity B
′, he faces
the off-equilibrium price P ′ = δUFH . The last two statements are formalized
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for either type ω in the following inequalities:
(−δUFP + δIFHP )BP ≥ (−P ′ + δIFH)B′ ∀B′ (1.22)
(−δUFP + δIFLP )BP ≥ (−P ′ + δIF ′L)B′ ∀B′ (1.23)
For the informed trader with good information not wanting to deviate,
−δUFP + δIFHP > −δUFH + δIFH . Otherwise, the informed trader would
always prefer to choose B′ < BP , even for BP = E, and obtain the higher
off-equilibrium payoff. Therefore, −δUFP +δIFHP > −δUFH+δIFH or equiv-
alently, δI < δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
. Recall, that for the informed trader to participate,
δI > δU
FP
FLP
. Together with the condition from the incentive compatibility
constraint, δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI > δU
FP
FLP
. There exists a δI ∈ [0, 1] satisfying the
latter condition if FH−FP
FH−FHP
> FP
FLP
, i.e. β <
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 . Recall for F
L
P > 0,
β < VLVH−VL and hence β < min{
VL
VH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 }.
From 1.22 we observe, the informed trader with good information is
indifferent between the equilibrium payoff and the off-equilibrium payoff if
E > BP = (−δU+δI)FH−δUFP+δIFHP
E. The equilibrium payoff however is maximized for
BP = E.
Next, consider incentive compatibility for the informed trader with bad
information in condition 1.23. Since
−δUFH+δIF ′L
−δUFP+δIFLP
< 1 it becomes clear that
BP = E also satisfies incentive compatibility of the informed trader with
bad information. Since
−δUFH+δIF ′L
−δUFP+δIFLP
< (−δU+δI)FH−δUFP+δIFHP
for δI > δU
FP
FLP
, incentive
compatibility is indeed more binding for the high type than for the low type.
This completes the characterization of the pooling equilibrium. Therein
the price P = δUFP does not reveal private information. There exist mul-
tiple pooling equilibria depending on the difference in liquidity needs. This
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Pooling equilibrium. If δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI > δU
FP
FLP
and β <
min{ VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 }, there exists a pooling equilibrium with a price P =
δUFP and equilibrium trade B
P = E.
The fact that trade in a the pooling equilibrium is always maximal, BP =
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E, implies that the expected quantity in the pooling equilibrium BP is larger
than the expected quantity in the separating equilibrium βE + (1 − β)BL.
This will be crucial for the welfare analysis in section 1.4.
1.3.3 Equilibrium characterization
After stating the existence conditions for each type of equilibrium, I can
now characterize all possible equilibria given the beliefs in 1.5 and 1.18. The
objective is to characterize equilibria depending on the liquidity difference,
δI − δU . Observe from the two previous propositions that the existence of
equilibria depends on the following three thresholds which characterize the
liquidity difference: FH−FP
FH−FHP
, FP
FLP
and FH−FL
FH−F ′H . In order to rank them, I need
to derive conditions on β and the difference VH−VL,the parameters on which
the firm values F depend. The derivation of the condition is relagated to
the appendix A.1. The equilibrium characterization is a preparatory step
for the welfare analysis. It provides hence the areas of parameters β, Vω and
δI − δU for which pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium co-exist,
for which they exist in adjacent parameter areas and for which they exist in
distant areas.
Lemma 1. Separating equilibrium only. For 1 ≥ β > min{ VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 },
there exists a separating equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > max{δU , δU
FH
F ′L
}).
Lemma 1 tells, if the difference between the high outcome and the low
outcome is very small, only the separating occurs.
Lemma 2. Separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium do not overlap.
For min{1, VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 } > β >
V 2L
(VH−VL)VH , there exists
 a separating equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > max{δU , δU
FH
F ′L
})
and
 a pooling equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI > δU
FP
FLP
).
For a given VH −VL and β, the separating equilibrium exists for a small
liquidity difference and the pooling equilibrium for a large liquidity difference
since FP
FLP
> FH−FL
FH−F ′H .
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Lemma 3. Separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium overlap. For
min{1, V 2L(VH−VL)VH } > β, there exists
 a pooling equilibrium only if δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI > δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H ,
 both a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI > max{δU FPFLP , δU
FH
F ′L
} and
 a separating equilibrium only if δU
FP
FLP
> δI > max{δU , δU FHF ′L }.
Pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium overlap if for an increas-
ing difference in the investment’s outcome VH−VL, the probability of observ-
ing the high outcome β decreases and the liquidity difference is intermediate.
This characterizes a situation in which the informed trader can make mod-
erate gains from trade since both the gain from the liquidity asymmetry and
the gain from information asymmetry are moderate.
1.4 Welfare Analysis
Recall, the purpose of this paper is to study how asset trading in the presence
of a large, monopolistically informed trader affects the investment in the real
economy. The firm representing the real economy is entirely owned by the
traders. In order to study the welfare, it is therefore sufficient to add the
traders’ profits. And I will do so from an ex-ante perspective10.
1.4.1 Profits
Denote by ψ ∈ {S, P} either type of equilibrium, i.e. separating equilibrium
or pooling equilibrium. The equilibrium profit of an informed trader I in a
separating equilibrium with Pω = δUFω and B
ω is
ΠωSI = (−δU + δI)FωBω. (1.24)
10As it is done in Dow and Rahi (2003) and Laffont and Maskin (1990).
23
For the uninformed trader U the equilibrium profit becomes
ΠωSU = δUEFω. (1.25)
Analogously, I obtain the profit of the informed trader I in a pooling
equilibrium with the equilibrium price P = δUFP and the equilibrium quan-
tity BP
ΠωPI = (−δUFP + δIFωP )BP . (1.26)
For the uninformed trader U the equilibrium profit becomes
ΠωSU = δUFPE. (1.27)
Observe that the profit of the informed trader is increasing in the quan-
tities Bω and BP while the profit of the uninformed trader is constant in
the quantities traded. Moreover, profits are increasing in the firm value F .
These two observations will guide the following welfare analysis.
1.4.2 Welfare
Summing the profits in the separating equilibrium yields the following ex-
ante welfare WS :
WS = δUE(βFH + (1− β)FL) + (δI − δU )(βFHBH + (1− β)FLBL).
(1.28)
The first summand is the expected gain of the owner of the firm and the
second summand is the expected gain from asset trade. Recall, BH = E
but BL(τ). Welfare increases in the amount of trade and in the firm value.
Similarly for the pooling equilibrium, ex-ante welfare WP is the sum of
the expected profits:
WP = δUEFP + (δI(βF
H
P + (1− β)FLP )− δUFP )BP . (1.29)
Again, the first summand is the expected gain of the firm’s owner and the
second summand reflects the expected gain from asset trade. With BP = E,
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in comparison to welfare in the separating equilibrium, expected trade is
always maximal. Firm values however are lower. Recall, (βFH+(1−β)FL) >
FP , FH > F
H
P and FL > F
L
P .
With the equilibrium quantities BP = BH = E, the separating equilib-
rium yields greater welfare if
∆W = WS −WP =δUE(βFH + (1− β)FL) + (δI − δU )(βFHE + (1− β)FLBL)
− δI(βFHP + (1− β)FLP )E > 0. (1.30)
Whether welfare in the separating equilibrium is larger than in the pool-
ing equilibrium depends on how much the informed trader with bad infor-
mation is trading, i.e. BL. It makes sense to compare the two types of
equilibria if they exist at the same time. Lemma 3 establishes, separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium exist at the same time if the following
conditions are satisfied
δU
FH − FL
FH − F ′H
> δI > δU
FP
FLP
, (1.31)
δU <
FLP
FP
and (1.32)
β < min{1, V
2
L
VH(VH − VL)}. (1.33)
The pooling equilibrium can yield greater welfare because the expected
quantity traded is larger than the expected quantity traded in the separating
equilibrium as obvious from the equilibrium conditions in subsection 1.3.3.
The increase in welfare from higher expected trade can outweigh the worse
investment decision in the pooling equilibrium with respect to the separating
equilibrium. For ∆W > 0, conditions have to specify the quantity of trade
of the informed trader with bad informationBL, the difference in liquidity
needs δI − δU and the informational wedge characterized by β, VH and VL.
Proposition 3. Welfare comparison. The separating equilibrium yields
greater welfare than the pooling equilibrium if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FP
FLP
,
V 2L
VH(VH−VL) > β and
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 either
(δI−δU )FH
δIF
′
H−δUFLE > B
L ≥ 0, V 2LVH(VH−VL) > β >
3VL−VH
(VH−VL)2 and VH > (1 +√
2)VL
 or
BL(VH) =
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
E, min{δU FH−FLFH−F ′H , δU
1
1−β} > δI , β > 2VH−3VLVH−VL
and either 32VL > VH > VL or 2VL > VH >
1
4(3 +
√
17)VL.
The proof is relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that the larger the difference between VH and
VL (the first bullet point of the proposition), the greater the inefficiency
from over investment (under investment) in the pooling equilibrium and
therefore even for no trade BL, the separating equilibrium yields greater
welfare. As the difference between VH and VL is decreasing (second bullet
point of the proposition), the gain from information revelation is decreasing
and therefore trade BL has to be strictly positive.
1.5 Conclusion
In order to answer the question whether asset prices efficiently guide the
allocation of investment, a welfare analysis, including all players, has to be
carried out. The existing literature has two drawbacks. First, it considers
models in which the non-informativeness of the price is exogenous and thus
the inefficient investment decision of the firm. And second, if any, it does
not provide a complete welfare analysis.
In order to improve on the two drawbacks, this paper studies an as-
set trade model in which an informed trader buys assets from uninformed
traders. The uninformed traders observe the informed traders demand and
infer the quality of the asset. Trade takes place due to asymmetric liquidity
needs. There exist two types of equilibria. One in which the asset prices
reveal private information and another in which the asset price is uninfor-
mative.
The informed trader has private information about the investment op-
portunity of a firm. The firm’s assets are traded on the secondary asset
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market. Basing its investment decision on the its asset price, the firm takes
the efficient investment decision, in case prices reveal information, and an
inefficient investment decision in case the price is uninformative. The exis-
tence of multiple equilibria establishes an endogenous inefficiency. I provide
testable conditions for the equilibrium existence.
Summing up the informed trader’s profit and the uninformed traders’
profits, I obtain a measure for welfare. The welfare analysis provides testable
conditions for which the equilibrium exhibiting information revelation yields
greater welfare.
This paper integrates asset trade and real economy investment in a sim-
ple model. This allows future research to study regulatory measures.
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Chapter 2
(In)Efficient Asset Trade and
a rationale for a Tobin Tax
2.1 Introduction
The Financial Transaction Tax (FTT), also known as Tobin tax or securities
transaction tax dates back to the article of James Tobin in 1978. Since
then it has been introduced in a lot of states. In some of those states it
has also been abolished afterwards. Matheson (2012) gives an overview of
the countries in which a FTT is currently active. Most recently, the FTT
has been introduced in France (August 2012) and Italy (March 2013). In
these two countries a tax between 0.1% and 0.22% is levied on purchases
of stocks. In the UK, since the early 90s’, there exists a so called ”Stamp
Duty” on equity purchases which amounts to 0.5%. Discussions about the
introduction of a FTT have restarted in the wake of the Financial crisis in
2008, in most Western countries1. Currently ongoing is a debate among
EU-countries about the introduction of a FTT by 20162.
Most of the time, governments introduce a FTT to raise money. Tobin
(1978), Stiglitz (1989) and Summers and Summers (1989) argue that the
1The discussion is followed, for example, by a theme-page of the Financial Times:
http://www.ft.com/intl/in-depth/financial-transaction-tax
2The current proposition can be found here (found on May 8th 2014):http://ec.
europa.eu/taxation_customs/taxation/other_taxes/financial_sector/
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tax affects mostly short-term speculation.
In this paper, I ask a more general question. Is a FTT able to improve
welfare?
Therefore, I setup the following model. There is a manager of a firm fac-
ing an investment opportunity with uncertain outcome, either good or bad.
When the manager decides upon the investment, he takes into account the
firm’s asset price on the secondary stock market, i.e. the manager updates
his prior beliefs about the outcome of the investment opportunity.
Asset trade takes place between an informed trader and uninformed
traders in a model a` la Laffont and Maskin (1990). The informed trader
observes either good or bad information about the investment prospect of
the firm. The uninformed traders are holding the assets of the firm, i.e.
they are the owners of the firm. By observing the demand of the informed
trader, the uninformed traders update their beliefs about the quality of the
asset and decide whether to sell. Notice, the informed trader takes into ac-
count the effect of his purchase on the asset price. Trade takes place due to
asymmetric liquidity needs. The uninformed traders are more liquidity con-
strained than the informed trader and hence the uninformed traders want to
sell the assets to the informed trader3. The FTT is levied on every purchase.
This is the case for most countries.
There are two types of pure strategy equilibria. First, a separating equi-
librium in which the informed trader reveals private information by demand-
ing a larger quantity when he has good information than when he has bad
information. The equilibrium price hence is either high or low. In order
for trade to take place, in either state, the uninformed trader has to be
more liquidity constrained than the informed trader. The equilibrium asset
prices depends on the liquidity needs of the uninformed trader. Or differ-
ently, when the uninformed trader needs liquidity, he is willing to decrease
the price at which he sells the assets proportional to his borrowing costs.
Trade occurs for an infinitesimal small difference in liquidity needs. Since
the asset prices reveal available information, the firm’s manager takes an
efficient investment decision and therefore the firm value is maximized given
3For an extensive discussion of asymmetric liquidity needs, refer to chapter 1.
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the observed information.
Second, there exists a pooling equilibrium in which the informed trader
does not reveal private information by demanding the same quantity no
matter whether he has good or bad information. Then the uninformed trader
cannot infer information from the informed trader’s demand and hence stays
with the prior beliefs. In the pooling equilibrium, the asset price reflects the
expected value of the asset which is below the prospect of the informed
trader with good information and above the prospect of the informed trader
with bad information. Just like in the separating equilibrium, also in the
pooling equilibrium, the asset price depend on the liquidity needs of the
uninformed trader. Since for the informed trader with good information the
pooling equilibrium price is relatively low in comparison to his prospect, he
is always willing to buy. The informed trader with bad information however
is only willing to buy if the negative difference between his prospect and the
expected value of the asset is outweighed by the uninformed trader’s liquidity
needs. In other words, in the pooling equilibrium, the uninformed trader
needs to be more liquidity constrained than in the separating equilibrium
for trade to take place between the uninformed trader and the informed
trader with bad information. With an uninformative asset price, the firm’s
manager over (under) invests in case of bad (good) information. Given
available information, the inefficient investment leads to a lower firm value
than in the separating equilibrium.
I show that separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium co-exist if the
variance of the investment’s outcome is relatively small and the difference in
liquidity needs is intermediate. More generally, this characterizes a situation
in which gains from asset trade for the informed trader are moderate. The
welfare analysis is carried out for the set of parameters for which separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium co-exist.
Since the firm is owned by traders, welfare in this economy is the ex-ante
joint profit of traders. The expected firm value increases in information rev-
elation. Hence, the firm owners prefer the separating equilibrium. Welfare
on the asset trade market increases in quantities traded. Since expected
trade in a pooling equilibrium is larger than in a separating equilibrium and
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agents are both traders and owners, the welfare trade-off is information vs.
trade. I provide conditions on the quantities traded such that the separating
equilibrium yields greater welfare.
Then, I show that if the economy is in a pooling equilibrium, there exists
an optimal tax which coordinates the economy on a separating equilibrium.
While the results are cast in terms of FTT, one can also interpret the tax
as any other transaction cost specific to the purchaser4. The mechanism
works as follows. For a pooling equilibrium to exist, the gains from liquid-
ity asymmetry must outweigh the loss from information asymmetry of the
informed trader with bad information. The Pareto optimal tax reduces the
gains from liquidity needs such that the loss from information asymmetry
of the informed trader with bad information is no longer outweighed.
There are few analytical analysis of the FTT, most notably Subrah-
manyam (1998), Dow and Rahi (2000), Dupont and Lee (2007) and Davila
(2013). These models have two common shortcomings.
First, information has no social value and therefore the notion of eco-
nomic welfare is restricted to the asset market. Therefore, the FTT in their
models can at best mitigate inefficiencies on the asset trade market. In this
paper, I extend the definition of welfare to the real economy and can thus
evaluate the FTT more holistically.
Second, the inefficiency in their models, i.e. the non-informativeness of
the prices, arises by assumption. In Subrahmanyam (1998) as in Dupont
and Lee (2007), there are passive noise traders ”blurring” the informational
content of the prices. Dow and Rahi (2000) consider on the buying side
uninformed liquidity traders in addition to the informed trader. Whether
prices reveal information depends on the share of uninformed traders and
is hence exogenous. Davila (2013), the closest in spirit to this analysis,
adopts a different asymmetry among traders’ preferences. He characterizes
an optimal FTT when traders disagree in beliefs. How much information
4The same result could not be achieved through variation of the Central Bank rate.
Recall from chapter 1, the interest rate difference (=liquidity difference) remains constant
for changes in the FED’s rate. But what would is needed is a cost/subsidy which affects
either buyer or seller.
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the price reveals depends on the degree of disagreement.
In order to alleviate the two drawbacks, I use a real investment function
as in Dow and Rahi (2003) and introduce it in an asset trade model a`
la Laffont and Maskin (1990). They provide a signaling model in which
non-information revelation occurs by choice. In Laffont and Maskin (1990),
trade takes place for asymmetric risk aptitudes. This leads to non-linear
profit functions which are hardly summable for welfare analysis. To obtain
linear equilibrium profits, I introduce asymmetric liquidity needs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I lay
out the model setup. Section 2.3 characterizes the pooling and separating
equilibrium. The welfare analysis is carried out in section 2.4 and section
2.5 concludes.
2.2 Model
Although I described the model setup already at length in chapter 1, I restate
the setup again for better readability. The reader aware of the model setup
can immediately skip to the next section where I provide the conditions for
the equilibrium existence.
The model has five dates t ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and a firm whose stock is
traded in the Financial Market. There are two types of risk-neutral traders
i ∈ {I, U}. An informed trader I and uniformed traders U of measure
E. Each of the uninformed traders holds one unit of the entire stock of
the asset. In line with their little asset holding, the uninformed traders are
assumed to be in perfect competition and thus price takers. Throughout the
model they are treated as one representative agent with an asset holding of
E. Informed trader and uninformed trader have different liquidity needs.
Liquidity needs are modeled with discount factors 1 > δi > 0. The higher
δi the less liquidity constrained is the trader. Assume, the informed trader
is less liquidity constrained than the uninformed trader, δI > δU . The
uninformed traders own assets of a firm which faces an uncertain investment
opportunity V ∈ {VH , VL}.
In t = 0, the informed trader observes private information ω ∈ {H,L}
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about the profitability of the firm’s investment opportunity. With proba-
bility 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, the firm’s investment opportunity yields a payoff VH and
with probability 1 − β, VL. Where VH > VL. Alternatively, the informed
trader can invest in a riskless asset of which the revenue is normalized to 0,
i.e. both the riskless rate and the revenue of the asset are 0. In t = 1, the in-
formed trader decides to buy E ≥ B ≥ 0 assets from the uninformed trader.
In t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the informed trader’s demand and
decides to sell or to keep the assets. In t = 3, the firm observes the asset
price P and takes its investment decision k. Eventually, in t = 4, either the
high payoff VH or the low payoff VL realizes. The timeline is depicted in
figure 2.1
 
𝑡 
𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 𝑡 = 3 𝑡 = 4 𝑡 = 0 
Informed trader 
observes 𝜔 
Informed trader 
buys 𝐵 assets 
Uninformed trader 
observes 𝐵 and 
decides to sell at 𝑃 
Manager observes 
𝑃 and decides to 
invest 𝑘 𝑉𝐻 or 𝑉𝐿 realizes 
Figure 2.1: Timeline
After observing the quantity chosen by the informed trader B, the un-
informed trader updates the prior belief and form the conditional belief
q = Pr(VH |B). Similarly the firm’s manager updates his belief about the
quality of the investment after observing the asset price P and form the
conditional belief r = Pr(VH |P ). Since there is not other private or public
information besides the information about the outcome of the investment
opportunity, in equilibrium, the price will reflect the demand of the informed
trader only, and thus P conveys the same information as B. Therefore I can
write r = q. For ease of notation, beliefs of both, the uninformed trader and
the firm will be denoted by q = Pr(VH |B).
The firm value F increases in investment k at a decreasing rate ∀k ≤ k∗,
where k∗ is the optimal investment level. c is a fixed marginal cost of
investment. The firm’s manager maximizes the firm value by choosing the
investment level k given the price he observes on the stock market. The
firm value increases in the prospect of the investment Vω. The manager’s
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optimization problem is written as
F (k) = kVω − c
2
k2 (2.1)
so that the expected firm value becomes
E(F |B) = kE(VH |B)− c
2
k2. (2.2)
The firm value function is adopted from Dow and Rahi (2003). The con-
cavity of the firm value function in k implies that private information has
social value even ex-ante.
After observing information in t = 0, the informed trader decides to buy
a quantity B at a price P in period t = 1. On the purchase, he pays a tax
τ . When choosing B, the informed trader not only conditions on his private
information ω but also takes into account the signal his choice is sending
to the uninformed trader and the firm. In t = 4, when the investment
value Vω realizes and thus the firm value F , the informed trader cashes in
on the assets bought. The informed trader evaluates the cash-flow from
the perspective of period t = 1, i.e. when deciding on the purchase. The
informed trader discounts the payoff of period t = 4 by δI . By how much he
discounts depends on how liquidity constrained he is. If, for example, the
borrowing rate is zero, the informed trader is indifferent between a payoff
today and tomorrow such that δI = 1. The higher the borrowing rate, the
lower the discount factor and the less willing is the informed trader to give
up a payoff today for a payoff tomorrow. The informed trader’s cash flow
from buying the risky asset at date t = 1 is
−(1 + τ)PB + δIBF. (2.3)
Instead of buying the risky asset, the informed trader can also buy the
riskless asset and obtain 0 payoff.
In t = 2, when selling an amount B of the total endowment E, the
uninformed trader receives a revenue PB from the sale. In t = 4, after
the realization of the investment value, just like the informed trader, the
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uninformed trader cashes in on the assets held. Evaluating the cash-flow
from period t = 1, the uninformed trader discounts the payoff from period
t = 4 by δU . The uninformed trader’s net present value (NPV) at t = 2 is
PB + δU (E −B)F (2.4)
In order to state the expected value of the uninformed trader’s NPV, I have
to specify the beliefs. Therefore, the introduction of the expected NPV is
deferred to section 2.3. Instead of selling assets, the uninformed trader can
also keep all the assets and receive a NPV at time t = 2 of δUEF .
The government receives all the tax revenues, i.e.
τPB. (2.5)
2.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The informed trader strategy is a mapping B : {Vω} → <+0 that prescribes
a quantity B(Vω) on the basis of the trader’s private information ω. The
uninformed trader strategy is a mapping P : <+0 → <+0 . The firm manager
strategy is a mapping k : <+0 → <+0 . Conditional beliefs for the unin-
formed trader and the firm manager are represented by a mapping that
associates to each quantity B a probability function Pr(·|B) on {VH , VL},
where Pr(Vω|B) is the probability that the uninformed trader and the firm
manager attach to a value Vω given quantity B.
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined by a triple of strategies
(B(·), P (·), k(·) and a family of conditional beliefs Pr(·|·) such that (i) for all
B in the range of B(·), Pr(·|B) is the conditional probability of Vω obtained
by updating the prior (β, (1 − β)), using B(·) in Bayesian fashion; (ii) for
all B(·), P argmaxP ∈ E(UU (·)), (iii) for all B(·) k∗ ∈ argmaxk E(F |B)
and (iv) for all ω B ∈ argmaxB E(UI(·)). Condition (i) stipulates that
the uninformed trader and the firm’s manager have rational expectations.
Conditions (ii) to (iv) require that traders be optimizing. In particular, they
imply participation constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
35
Market clearing takes place through the adjustment of the price P to
the quantity demanded B. I.e. the informed trader submits a market order.
Observing the market order, the uninformed trader, acting as a market
maker, updates the belief about the quality of the asset and sets the price.
In equilibrium, there has to be a unique price-quantity bundle {P,B}.
I derive the equilibria as in chapter 1. To avoid repetition, I remark
which optimization problems remain unchanged and just state the resulting
conditions as derived in chapter 1. For those optimization problems affected
by the introduction of the tax τ , I will briefly describe the effect of τ on the
optimization problem and state the resulting condition.
2.3.1 Equilibrium existence
Separating equilibrium
In the separating equilibrium, depending on the private information ω ∈
{H,L}, the informed trader buys different quantities BH and BL.
The firm manager’s beliefs and the uninformed trader’s beliefs are not
affected by the introduction of a tax.
q = Pr(H|B) =

1 if B = BH
0 if B = BL
1 B′ 6= BH ∧B′ 6= BL
. (2.6)
Also the firm manager’s optimal choice remains, kω = Vωc . Given the
optimal choice, the firm value from the manager’s perspective (and the un-
informed trader’s perspective) is Fω =
V 2ω
2c .
The tax τ is levied on purchases. The uninformed trader is only selling
assets. Therefore, participation of the uninformed trader is unaffected by
the tax. Prices remain hence unchanged, i.e. Pω = δUFω. Notice, the price
decreases the more liquidity constrained the uninformed trader.
Whether the informed trader buys the risky asset or the risk-less asset
is affected by the tax since he has to pay the tax on the value purchased.
The equilibrium firm value from the informed trader’s perspective after
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observing information ω is Fω =
V 2ω
2c . With the equilibrium price P
ω =
δUFω, the participation constraint of the informed trader with information
ω becomes:
−(1 + τ)δUFωBω + δIBωFω ≥ 0, (2.7)
with the revenue of the risk-less asset normalized to 0. For any positive trade
Bω ≥ 0 both types’ participation constraints are satisfied if δI(1+τ) > δU . The
informed trader buys the risky asset whenever he is less liquidity constrained
than the uninformed trader. The informed trader has to pay a proportion
relative to τ of the purchase value to the government. For the informed
trader to be willing to purchase the risky asset, the difference in liquidity
needs, needs to be larger than without a tax.
In the separating equilibrium, I have to show, given beliefs q as specified
in 2.6, prices Pω = δUFω and firm value Fω =
V 2ω
2c , that B
H and BL are
optimal choices for the respective type of informed trader. In particular
that the informed trader with good information H does not want to mimic
the informed trader with bad information L and vice versa:
−(1 + τ)δUFωBω + δIBωFω ≥ −(1 + τ)δUF−ωB−ω + δIB−ωF ′ω (2.8)
where − ω 6= ω.
If an informed trader with information ω chooses B−ω, from his perspective
the firm’s value F ′ω =
V−ω
c (Vω − V−ω2 ). Moreover, I have to show that the
informed trader with information ω chooses Bω and not any other quantity
B′ 6= Bω ∀ ω, i.e.
(−PH + δIFH)BH ≥ (−P ′ + δIFH)B′ ∀B′ and (2.9)
(−PL + δIFL)BL ≥ (−P ′ + δIF ′L)B′ ∀B′. (2.10)
With the off-equilibrium price P ′ = δUFH . The reasoning for finding BH
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and BL is identical to chapter 1 and yields the following conditions:
BH = E, (2.11)
(−(1 + τ)δU + δI)FH
−(1 + τ)δUFL + δIF ′H
E ≥ BL ≥ max{0, −(1 + τ)δUFH + δIF
′
L
(−(1 + τ)δU + δI)FL E}.
(2.12)
In the following proposition, I report for which parameters of the model,
there exists a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Separating equilibrium. There exist separating equilibria
with price Pω = δUFω, ω ∈ {H,L} and quantities as specified in 2.11 and
2.12 if
 δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
(1+τ) > δU and VH >
1
2(1 +
√
5)VL or
 δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
(1+τ) > δU
FH
F ′L
and 12(1 +
√
5)VL > VH > VL.
In the separating equilibrium prices reveal available information. Trade
is maximal given good information. For the informed trader with good
information not to mimic the informed trader with bad information, trade
must be less than maximal in the case of bad information. Moreover, the
maximal amount of trade, refer to the left hand side of inequality 2.12, in the
presence of bad information is decreasing the higher the tax τ . The intuition
is that the tax increases the potential gain of the informed trader with bad
information from mimicking the informed trader with bad information and
thus pay a lower price.
Also, existence of the separating equilibrium depends on the tax τ . An
increase in the tax reduces the difference in liquidity needs and hence the
scope for trade. In the separating equilibrium , trade takes place due to
asymmetric liquidity needs, i.e. the informed trader buys assets from the
uninformed trader if the uninformed trader is asking a lower price than
the informational value in order to satisfy liquidity needs. If however the
informed trader has to pay a tax on his purchases, the gain from the liquidity
difference shrinks.
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Pooling equilibrium
In the pooling equilibrium, the informed trader buys the same quantity BP
in either state.
Again, beliefs of the manager and the uninformed trader are unaffected
by the tax τ :
q = Pr(H|B) =
β if B = BP1 B′ 6= BP . (2.13)
Also the firm manager’s optimal choice remains, kP = E(V )c with E(V ) =
βVH+(1−β)VL. Given the optimal choice, the firm value from the manager’s
perspective (and the uninformed trader’s perspective) is FP =
E(V )2
2c .
Participation of the uninformed trader is unaffected by the tax. Prices
remain hence unchanged, i.e. P = δUFP .
The informed trader’s participation however is affected by the tax. Given
the price P = δUFP , the informed trader decides whether to buy B
P of the
risky asset or the riskless asset which gives a return of 0. His participation
constraints in either state is
−(1 + τ)δUFPBP + δIBPFωP ≥ 0. (2.14)
The firm value from the perspective of the informed trader takes into account
the investment decision of the manager, kP = E(V )c , given the privately
observed information ω. Therefore, the firm value from the informed trader’s
perspective are FωP =
E(V )
c (Vω−E(V )2 ) with FLP > 0 if and only if VLVH−VL > β.
Observe, FHP > FP > F
L
P . Implying that the informed trader with good
information faces a higher return from the risky asset than the informed
trader with bad information, given the uninformed choice of the manager.
Both, the informed trader with good information and the informed trader
with bad information however faces a lower payoff than if the manager made
an informed choice, FωP < F
ω. The participation constraint for the informed
trader with bad information is more binding. In fact, if ω = L, the left hand
side of the inequality is smaller than if ω = H. Solving the participation
of the informed trader with bad information for δI yields for any B
P ≥ 0:
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δI
1+τ ≥ δU FPFLP . Since
FP
FLP
> 1, the informed trader needs to be considerably
less liquidity constrained than the uninformed trader, and in particular less
than in the separating equilibrium where participation was ensured if δI >
δU . Observe that
FP
FLP
increases in β. That is the more likely the good
outcome, the larger needs to be the difference between the informed trader’s
liquidity needs and the uninformed trader’s liquidity needs.
In the pooling equilibrium, I have to show that there exists a single
BP for which both types of informed traders are willing to buy the risky
asset. In particular, that there is no B′ 6= BP that either of the two types
would prefer over buying BP . This is formalized in the following incentive
compatibility constraint:
(−(1 + τ)δUFP + δIFHP )BP ≥ (−(1 + τ)P ′ + δIFH)B′ ∀B′ (2.15)
(−(1 + τ)δUFP + δIFLP )BP ≥ (−(1 + τ)P ′ + δIF ′L)B′ ∀B′ (2.16)
with P ′ = δUFH . The off-equilibrium price follows with the off-equilibrium
beliefs and the uninformed trader breaking even. Incentive compatibility is
satisfied if BP = E. The reasoning for this result
From 2.15 we observe, the informed trader with good information is in-
different between the equilibrium payoff and the off-equilibrium payoff if
E > BP = (−(1+τ)δU+δI)FH−(1+τ)δUFP+δIFHP
E. The equilibrium payoff however is maxi-
mized for BP = E. This is a sufficient condition for incentive compatibility
of the informed trader with bad information.
The lower bound for BP , (−(1+τ)δU+δI)FH−(1+τ)δUFP+δIFHP
is decreasing in τ . BP = E
hence remains an optimal choice for the informed trader for any 1 > τ > 0.
The existence of a pooling equilibrium is summarized in the following
proposition.
Proposition 5. Pooling equilibrium. If δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI1+τ > δU
FP
FLP
and
β < min{ VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 }, there exists a pooling equilibrium with a price
P = δUFP and equilibrium trade B
P = E.
The pooling equilibrium depends on the tax through the participation
constraint of the informed trader and the incentive compatibility constrained
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of the informed trader. As for the separating equilibrium, the gain from
trade due to the difference in liquidity needs decreases and thus the range
of the existence of the pooling equilibrium. The optimal amount of trade is
not affected by the tax. This is a crucial observation for the welfare analysis.
2.3.2 Equilibrium characterization
After stating the existence conditions for each type of equilibrium, I can
now characterize all possible equilibria given the beliefs in 2.6 and 2.13. The
objective is to characterize equilibria depending on the liquidity difference,
δI − δU . Observe from the two previous propositions that the existence of
equilibria depends on the following three thresholds which characterize the
liquidity difference: FH−FP
FH−FHP
, FP
FLP
and FH−FL
FH−F ′H . In order to rank them, I need
to derive conditions on β and the difference VH − VL,the parameters on
which the firm values F depend. The derivation of the condition is identical
to chapter 1. The equilibrium characterization is a preparatory step for the
welfare analysis. It shows when the parameter areas for which separating
equilibrium and pooling equilibrium exist respectively, overlap and when
they do not.
Lemma 4. Separating equilibrium only. For 1 ≥ β > min{ VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 },
there exists a separating equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
1+τ > max{δU , δU FHF ′L }).
Lemma 4 tells, if the difference between the high outcome and the low
outcome is very small, only the separating occurs.
Lemma 5. Separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium do not overlap.
For min{1, VLVH−VL ,
V 2L
(VH−VL)2 } > β >
V 2L
(VH−VL)VH , there exists
 a separating equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
1+τ > max{δU , δU FHF ′L })
and
 a pooling equilibrium only (if δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI1+τ > δU
FP
FLP
).
For a given VH −VL and β, the separating equilibrium exists for a small
liquidity difference and the pooling equilibrium for a large liquidity difference
since FP
FLP
> FH−FL
FH−F ′H .
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Lemma 6. Separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium overlap. For
min{1, V 2L(VH−VL)VH } > β, there exists
 a pooling equilibrium only if δU
FH−FP
FH−FHP
> δI1+τ > δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H ,
 both a pooling equilibrium and a separating equilibrium if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
1+τ > max{δU FPFLP , δU
FH
F ′L
} and
 a separating equilibrium only if δU
FP
FLP
> δI1+τ > max{δU , δU FHF ′L }.
Pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium overlap if for an increas-
ing difference in the investment’s outcome VH−VL, the probability of observ-
ing the high outcome β decreases and the liquidity difference is intermediate.
This characterizes a situation in which the informed trader can make mod-
erate gains from trade since both the gain from the liquidity asymmetry and
the gain from information asymmetry are moderate.
2.4 Welfare
The firm representing the real economy is entirely owned by the traders.
Therefore, welfare is captured by the sum of the traders’ profits and the
government’s revenue from the tax. Consider ex-ante profits as in Dow and
Rahi (2003) and Laffont and Maskin (1990).
2.4.1 Profits
Denote by ψ ∈ {S, P} either type of equilibrium, i.e. separating equilibrium
or pooling equilibrium. The equilibrium profit of an informed trader I in a
separating equilibrium with Pω = δUFω and B
ω is
ΠωSI = (−(1 + τ)δU + δI)FωBω. (2.17)
For the uninformed trader U the equilibrium profit becomes
ΠωSU = δUEFω. (2.18)
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The government’s revenue is
ΠωSG = τδUFωB
ω. (2.19)
Analogously, I obtain the profit of the informed trader I in a pooling
equilibrium with the equilibrium price P = δUFP and the equilibrium quan-
tity BP
ΠωPI = (−(1 + τ)δUFP + δIFωP )BP . (2.20)
For the uninformed trader U the equilibrium profit becomes
ΠωPU = δUFPE. (2.21)
And the government’s revenue is
ΠωPG = τδUFPB
P . (2.22)
Observe that the profit of the informed trader is increasing in the quantities
Bω and BP . Furthermore, profits are increasing in the firm value F . These
two observations will guide the following welfare analysis.
2.4.2 Welfare
The sum of the expected profits in the separating equilibrium is:
WS = δUE(βFH + (1− β)FL) + (δI − δU )(βFHBH + (1− β)FLBL).
(2.23)
And welfare in the pooling equilibrium becomes:
WP = δUEFP + (δI(βF
H
P + (1− β)FLP )− δUFP )BP . (2.24)
Observe, the tax τ does not enter in either of the two welfare functions,
which implies there is no primary tax effect. This is due to the fact that all
agents, traders and government, are risk neutral and thus have a linear utility
function. Therefore, the tax payment of the trader and the tax revenue of
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the government cancel out. The tax affects welfare through the participation
constraints and incentive compatibility constraints of the informed trader.
2.4.3 Welfare analysis
The objective of the analysis is to find a tax τ such that it improves welfare.
Therefore I first Pareto rank separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium
and then show for which tax the Pareto optimal equilibrium is attained.
It makes sense to compare equilibrium if they exist for the same values
of parameters. From lemma 6, we know pooling equilibrium and separat-
ing equilibrium overlap if min{1, V 2L(VH−VL)VH } > β and δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI
1+τ >
max{δU FPFLP , δU
FH
F ′L
}. Moreover, observe adjacent to the area of multiple equi-
libria, there is the area δU
FP
FLP
> δI1+τ > max{δU , δU FHF ′L } in which only the
separating equilibrium exists.
Consider the following situation. The economy is in a pooling equilib-
rium with δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > max{δU
FP
FLP
, δU
FH
F ′L
}. The introduction of a tax
τ changes the liquidity difference to δU
FP
FLP
> δI1+τ > max{δU , δU FHF ′L } such
that only a separating equilibrium exists. Therefore I have to show that wel-
fare in the separating equilibrium is larger when equilibria overlap and that
welfare in the separating equilibrium is still larger when only the separating
equilibrium exists and the informed trader has to pay a tax.
Given the equilibrium quantities BP = BH = E, welfare in the separat-
ing equilibrium is larger than in the pooling equilibrium if
∆W = WS −WP =δUE(βFH + (1− β)FL) + (δI − δU )(βFHE + (1− β)FLBL)
− δI(βFHP + (1− β)FLP )E > 0. (2.25)
If separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium co-exist, from chapter
1, we know for which conditions the separating equilibrium yields larger
welfare than the pooling equilibrium. For readability, the proposition is
reported here again5.
Proposition 6. Welfare comparison. The separating equilibrium yields
5For the proof, refer to chapter 1.
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greater welfare than the pooling equilibrium if δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FP
FLP
,
V 2L
VH(VH−VL) > β and
 either
(δI−δU )FH
δIF
′
H−δUFLE > B
L ≥ 0, V 2LVH(VH−VL) > β >
3VL−VH
(VH−VL)2 and VH > (1 +√
2)VL
 or
BL(VH) =
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
E, min{δU FH−FLFH−F ′H , δU
1
1−β} > δI , β > 2VH−3VLVH−VL
and either 32VL > VH > VL or 2VL > VH >
1
4(3 +
√
17)VL.
After the introduction of the tax, the separating equilibrium yields larger
welfare for the following tax.
Proposition 7. Pareto optimal FTT. There is a Pareto optimal tax
 With BL ≥ 0, min{ V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
− 1, δIδU − 1} > τ >
δI
δU
FLP
FP
− 1 if
min{δU FPFLP
V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
, δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H } > δI > δU
FP
FLP
.
 And a Pareto optimal tax with BL > 0, min{ δIδU − 1,
β
1−β} > τ > 0, if
δU
1−β > δI > δU
FP
FLP
and β > 2VH−3VLVH−VL .
The proof is relegated to appendix B.1.
As we know from lemma 6, pooling equilibrium and separating equilib-
rium overlap if gains for the informed trader from both information asym-
metry 6 and liquidity asymmetry are intermediate. For given information
asymmetry, for a small liquidity asymmetry there exists a separating equilib-
rium only. The idea of proposition 7 is to decrease liquidity asymmetry such
that the pooling equilibrium ceases to exist and the separating equilibrium
exists only.
In the following, I try to shed some light on the underlying mechanism.
Recall, prices have two components, the informational component, E(Vω|B)
and the liquidity component, δU . In a pooling equilibrium, the informa-
tional component of the price, E(V ), is higher than private information
6For a given β, information asymmetry is large if VH − VL is large. Or, for a given
VH − VL, information asymmetry is large if β = 12 .
45
of the informed trader with bad information Vω. In order for him to buy
the asset nevertheless, the uninformed trader must be sufficiently liquidity
constrained such that the informational loss is at least outweighed by the liq-
uidity gain. When pooling equilibrium and separating equilibrium co-exist,
liquidity gains outweigh informational loss by few. The introduction of the
tax decreases further the liquidity gain up to the point that the informed
trader’s informational loss is no longer outweighed by the liquidity gain and
thus the informed trader with bad information no longer wants to buy the
asset.
2.5 Conclusion
I identify a ”case” in which asset trade leads to economic inefficiency. I show
that in this ”case” the inefficiency can be alleviated by the introduction of
a FTT. The ”case” is an economy consisting of an asset trade market and
a firm representing the real economy. The firm has an investment oppor-
tunity with an uncertain return. Before deciding on the investment level,
the firm’s manager consults the firm’s asset price. It does so because the
informed trader has superior information about the investment’s return.
The asset trade market is modeled in a simple signaling setup in which
a monopolistically informed trader, with either good or bad information,
buys assets from uninformed traders. On every purchase, a FTT is levied.
The uninformed trader sells the assets for liquidity needs. I find a sepa-
rating equilibrium in which the informed trader chooses different quantities
depending on the information observed. Hence, prices reveal available in-
formation and the firm takes the efficient investment decision. There exists
also a pooling equilibrium in which the informed trader chooses the same
quantity regardless of his information. Therefore the price does not reveal
available information and the firm takes an inefficient investment decision.
The welfare ranking of the two types of equilibria depends on both the
amount of trade and information revelation. For the trader(s) who own(s)
the firm, information revelation (separating equilibrium) is always better.
The pooling equilibrium features more trade than the separating equilib-
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rium and thus increases welfare of the pooling equilibrium. The trade-off
for total welfare is hence information revelation vs. trade. I provide con-
ditions on the traded quantities for which the separating equilibrium yields
greater welfare. If the economy is in a pooling equilibrium, the government
can introduce a tax which coordinates the economy on the Pareto optimal
separating equilibrium.
The main contribution of this article is to identify an endogenous ineffi-
ciency which can be corrected by a FTT.
It remains a partial equilibrium model and hence intrinsically features
the typical shortcomings. First, it still does not allow to study the effect of
the tax on a more complex economy with different countries for example.
The paper also does not provide any insights on inter-temporal effects of the
tax.
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Chapter 3
Optimal Timing of Asset
Purchases
3.1 Introduction
The idea that Financial Markets aggregate and reveal dispersed information
is an important part of economic thinking. The seminal paper by Kyle (1985)
and the more recent papers by Back and Baruch (2004) and Ostrovsky (2012)
find that if a monopolistically trader with long-lived private information
buys assets in finitely many periods, information is always revealed. To
obtain information revelation, this literature requires that trade takes place
in every period and the presence of noise traders.
This paper shows that in the presence of rational traders, instead of non-
rational noise traders, it is not optimal to trade in every period and at the
same time information is not revealed.
The model considered goes as follows. Asset trade takes place between
an informed trader and uninformed traders in a twice repeated model a` la
Laffont and Maskin (1990). The informed trader observes either good or
bad information about the prospect of the asset. The uninformed traders
are holding the assets. By observing the demand of the informed trader,
the uninformed traders update their beliefs about the quality of the asset
and decide whether to sell. Notice, the informed trader takes into account
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the effect of his purchase on the beliefs and thus the asset price. Trade can
take place in two periods. The informed trader is less liquidity constrained
than the uninformed traders. The liquidity needs can vary over time but
the the informed trader is always required to be less liquidity constrained
than the uninformed trader. Liquidity needs are modeled with different
discount factors. The assumptions on the liquidity needs are supported by
the stylized fact in figure 1.1. It shows the liquidity needs by different types
of traders.
Liquidity needs are reflected by borrowing rates. In the US, there are
different borrowing rates. There is a small number of traders who have access
to the FED Funds Rate. Those are the Primary Dealers1 who are eligible to
engage in repurchase agreements (REPOs) with the FED. Essentially, the
FED provides a collateralized debt to the Primary Dealers. Currently, there
are 22 Primary Dealers. Among them only the biggest financial institutions
in the world in terms of assets under management (AUM). For example
BNP Paribas, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P.
Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Nomura and UBS. Most of the other investment
institutions face the Bank Prime Loan Rate which is offered by banks to
their most favorable clients. The Bank Prime Loan Rate and the FED
Funds Rate are depicted in figure 1.1.
There is a systematic difference in the borrowing rate of the Primary
Dealers, i.e. the FED Funds Rate, and the borrowing rate of most of the
other Financial Market participants, i.e. the Bank Prime Loan Rate. Facing
a relatively high borrowing rate, Financial Market participants who hold
assets can, instead of borrowing, sell their assets. Since Primary Dealers
face a lower borrowing rate, they can borrow money and buy the assets
from the other Financial Market participants. The latter are willing to
decrease the asset price, at which they sell, proportionally to their liquidity
needs. This creates a motive for trade. Over time, figure 1.1 depicts an
almost constant positive difference between the Bank Prime Loan Rate and
the FED Funds Rate.
1The list of current and historic Primary Dealers can be found on New York’s Fed
website: http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pridealers_current.html\#tabs-1.
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The main result is that it is not optimal to trade in both periods in the
presence of rational traders. Moreover, with one period trade, there exist
two types of equilibria. A separating equilibrium in which the price reveals
available information. And a pooling equilibrium exhibiting no information
revelation.
In order to provide the intuition, I first lay out the drivers of a one pe-
riod equilibrium. In pooling equilibria, the informed trader does not reveal
private information by demanding the same quantity no matter whether
he has good or bad information. Then the uninformed trader cannot infer
information from the informed trader’s demand and hence stays with the
prior beliefs. In the pooling equilibrium, the asset price reflects the expected
value of the asset which is below the prospect of the informed trader with
good information and above the prospect of the informed trader with bad
information. The equilibrium price is decreasing in the liquidity needs of
the uninformed trader. The asset price consists of an informational compo-
nent and a liquidity component. Given the informed trader is at most as
liquidity constrained as the uninformed trader, for the informed trader with
good information the pooling equilibrium price is relatively low in compar-
ison to his prospect and thus he is always willing to buy. The informed
trader with bad information however is only willing to buy if the negative
difference between his prospect and the expected value of the asset is out-
weighed by the uninformed trader’s liquidity needs. In other words, in the
pooling equilibrium, in addition to the liquidity wedge, there is an informa-
tion wedge. The information wedge is to the detriment of the uninformed
trader with bad information and to the benefit of the informed trader with
good information. Therefore, the liquidity wedge has to outweigh, i.e. the
informed trader has to be strictly less liquidity constrained than the unin-
formed trader, the information wedge for the uninformed trader with bad
information to participate.
In the one-period separating equilibrium, the informed trader reveals pri-
vate information by purchasing more after observing good information than
after observing bad information. Trade takes only place if the uninformed
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trader is at least as liquidity constrained as the informed trader2. The
asset price, again, has an informational component and a liquidity compo-
nent. The informational component reflects the information of the informed
trader. Due to the liquidity component, the asset price decreases the more
the uninformed trader is liquidity constrained.
Long-lived information imply that the information observed at the be-
ginning persist over the two rounds of trade until the outcome of the asset
eventually realizes. Traders discount future revenue from the asset when
they trade. Therefore the future value of the asset in the first round of
trade is smaller than in the second round of trade. Having clarified the roles
of liquidity needs and long-lived information, I can proceed to the presenta-
tion of the main result of the paper.
Trade takes place in the first period only in both the separating equilib-
rium and the pooling equilibrium. This is due to the fact that the informed
trader is less liquidity constrained than the uninformed trader in both pe-
riods. Comparing the price of the first and the second period, from the
perspective of the first period, the informed trader faces a lower price in the
first period than in the second period. More broadly speaking, the relative
(to the informed trader) urgency of cash of the uninformed traders, makes
the uninformed traders decrease the price for the assets from the informed
trader and the more so, the earlier the uninformed traders can get the cash.
The result of information revelation in the literature is an artifact of the
selection of equilibrium beliefs and noise traders. The separating equilib-
rium in this paper in fact features information revelation. This is the result
obtained by the literature (Kyle (1985), Bach and Baruck (2004) and Os-
trovsky (2012)). It however features also no information revelation in the
pooling equilibrium. Which is different from Kyle (1985), Bach and Baruck
(2004) and Ostrovsky (2012).
The introduction of asymmetric liquidity needs, helps to circumvent the
use of non-rational noise traders. Morevover, it simplifies the analysis such
that I can consider beliefs, as suggested by Laffont and Maskin (1990), which
2Note, the difference. For the pooling equilibrium to exist, the uninformed trader needs
to be strictly more liquidity constrained than the informed trader.
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generate pooling equilibria in which information is not revealed. The liter-
ature following Kyle (1985), and in particular most recent publications by
Ostrovsky (2012)3 and Back and Baruch (2004), finds that in a model with
a monopolistically informed trader and finitely repeated trade, information
is revealed through asset prices. This is due to the uncertain demand of
noise traders. Noise traders demand/supply follows a random distribution.
Substituting noise traders by optimizing, uninformed traders yields that it is
not optimal to trade in every period and information is not always revealed.
In the remainder of this paper, section 3.2 presents the model set-up. In
section 3.3, I derive both separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium.
In section 3.4, the assumption of asymmetric liquidity needs is discussed.
Section 3.5 offers some concluding remarks.
3.2 Model
There are four periods T ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. In periods T = 1 and T = 2 trade
takes place on two dates t ∈ {1, 2}. There are two types of risk-neutral
traders i ∈ {I, U}. An informed trader I and uniformed traders U of mea-
sure E. Each of the uninformed traders holds one unit of the entire stock of
the asset. In line with their little asset holding, the uninformed traders are
assumed to be in perfect competition and thus price takers. Throughout the
model they are treated as one representative agent with an asset holding of
E. Informed trader and uninformed trader have different liquidity needs.
Liquidity needs are modeled with discount factors which may be different
for each period T , 1 > δiT > 0. The higher δiT the less liquidity constrained
is the trader. According to the stylized fact, the informed trader is less liq-
uidity constrained than the uninformed traders but the size of the liquidity
wedge is determined endogenously. Moreover, assume that traders know
each others liquidity needs now and in the future period4.
3Theorem 5.
4It is a strong assumption that there is certainty about future liquidity constraints.
This assumption can be relaxed by having δi2 follow some random distribution f(δi2). As
long as f(δi2) is independent of the distribution of the asset’s return, the results of the
model are unaffected.
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In T = 0, the informed trader observes a private information ω ∈ {H,L}
about the profitability of the risky asset. With probability 0 ≤ β ≤ 1,
the risky asset yields a payoff VH and with probability 1 − β, VL. Where
VH > VL. Alternatively, the informed trader can invest in a riskless asset
of which the revenue is normalized to 0, i.e. both the riskless rate and the
revenue of the asset are 0. In T = 1 and T = 2, asset trade takes place as
follows: In t = 1, the informed trader decides to buy E ≥ BT ≥ 0 assets
from the uninformed trader. In t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the
informed trader’s demand BT , updates the prior belief according to Bayes’
rule qT = Pr(VH |BT ) and decides to sell or to keep the assets. In T = 3,
either the high payoff VH or the low payoff VL realizes.
In t = 1 of T = 1 and T = 2, the informed trader decides to buy a
quantity BT at a price PT . When choosing BT , the informed trader not
only conditions on his private information ω but also takes into account
the beliefs of the uninformed trader. In T = 3, when the asset’s value Vω
realizes, the informed trader cashes in on the assets bought. The informed
trader evaluates the cash-flow from the perspective of period T = 1 and
T = 2 respectively, i.e. when deciding on the purchases. The informed
trader discounts the payoff of period T = 3 by δI2 when buying in T = 2
and by δI1δI2 when buying in T = 1. By how much he discounts depends on
how liquidity constrained he is. If, for example, the borrowing rate is zero,
the informed trader is indifferent between a payoff today and tomorrow such
that δIT = 1. The higher the borrowing rate, the lower the discount factor
and the less willing is the informed trader to give up a payoff today for a
payoff tomorrow. The informed trader’s cash flow from buying risky assets
in period T = 2 is
−P2B2 + δI2(B1 +B2)Vω. (3.1)
If the informed trader bought assets in T = 1, he will continue to hold them
in T = 2 regardless of whether he purchases further assets or not so that
his outside option, i.e. the NPV from buying the riskless asset and not the
risky asset becomes δI2B1Vω. When purchasing assets in period T = 1, the
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informed trader takes into account the effect of his purchase B1 on revenues
in T = 2 and T = 3.
−P1B1 + δI1(−P2B2 + δI2(B1 +B2)Vω). (3.2)
Instead of buying the risky asset in T = 1, the informed trader can also buy
the riskless asset and obtain the payoff δI1(−P2B2 + δI2B2Vω).
In t = 2 of periods T = 1 and T = 2, when selling an amount BT of
the total endowment E, the uninformed trader receives a revenue PTBT
from the sale. In T = 3, after the realization of the asset’s value, just like
the informed trader, the uninformed trader cashes in on the assets held.
Evaluating the cash-flow from period T = 1 and T = 2 respectively, the
uninformed trader discounts the payoff from period T = 3 by δU1δU2, in
T = 1 and by δU2, in T = 2. I delay the introduction of the uninformed
traders’ uncertainty about the asset’s value until section 3.3 and instead
express the uninformed traders’ payoffs as net present value (NPV) given
the state ω. The uninformed trader’s NPV in state ω at T = 2 is
P2B2 + δU2(E −B1 −B2)Vω. (3.3)
The NPV of the uninformed trader from not selling assets in T = 2 is
δU2(E−B1)Vω. When selling assets in period T = 1, the uninformed trader
takes into account the effect of his purchase B1 on revenues in T = 2 and
T = 3. The uninformed trader’s NPV in T = 1 is
P1B1 + δU1(P2B2 + δU2(E −B1 −B2)Vω). (3.4)
Instead of selling assets, the uninformed trader can also keep the assets, i.e.
B1 = 0, and receive a NPV of δU1(P2B2 + δU2(E −B2)Vω) in period T = 1.
3.3 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
The informed trader strategy is a mapping BT : {Vω} → <+0 that prescribes
a quantity BT (Vω) on the basis of the trader’s private information ω. The
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uninformed trader strategy is a mapping PT : <+0 → <+0 . Conditional be-
liefs for the uninformed trader are represented by a mapping that associates
to each quantity BT a probability function Pr(·|BT ) on {VH , VL}, where
Pr(Vω|BT ) is the probability that the uninformed trader and the firm man-
ager attach to a value Vω given quantity BT .
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is defined by a bundle of strategies
(BT (·), PT (·)) and a family of conditional beliefs Pr(·|·) such that (i) for
all BT in the range of BT (·), Pr(·|BT ) is the conditional probability of
Vω obtained by updating the prior (β, (1 − β)), using BT (·) in Bayesian
fashion; (ii) for all BT (·), PT argmaxPT ∈ E(UU (·)), and (iii) for all ω, BT
∈ argmaxBT E(UI(·)). Condition (i) stipulates that the uninformed trader
and the firm’s manager have rational expectations. Conditions (ii) to (iii)
require that traders be optimizing. In particular, they imply participation
constraints and incentive compatibility constraints.
Market clearing takes place through the adjustment of the price PT to the
quantity demanded BT . I.e. the informed trader submits a market order.
Observing the market order, the uninformed trader, acting as a market
maker, updates the belief about the quality of the asset and sets the price.
In equilibrium, there has to be a unique price-quantity bundle {PT , BT }.
3.3.1 Separating equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, the informed trader buys different quantities in
either state. Therefore, the purchase reveals private information. Suppose,
the informed trader, in period T , buys BHT after observing H and B
L
T after
observing L, then I invoke the uninformed trader’s conditional beliefs as:
q1 = Pr(H|B1) =

1 if B1 = B
H
1
0 if B1 = B
L
1
1 otherwise
. (3.5)
The conditional beliefs in T = 1 imply that the uninformed trader and
the firm update their priors such that if they observe BH1 , they are sure
55
to face the informed trader with good information and if they observe BL,
they know the informed trader with bad information is buying the asset.
The intuition for the off-equilibrium belief is the informed trader with good
information H wants to mimic the informed trader with bad information
L in order to get a low price5. Discontinuity of the conditional beliefs is
a natural consequence of the binomial distribution of the random variable
Vω. This is different from Laffont and Maskin (1990). They can potentially
obtain continuous, monotonic beliefs since the signal in their model is noisy.
In T = 2, the uninformed trader’s beliefs depend on the trades observed
in both periods. I.e. if the informed trader observed H, he has to buy
BH1 and B
H
2 for the uninformed trader to believe that he observed good
information. The same reasoning applies for the informed trader with bad
information L.
q2 = Pr(H|B2) =

1 if B2 = B
H
2 ∧ B1 = BH1
0 if B2 = B
L
2 ∧ B1 = BL1
1 otherwise
. (3.6)
The intuition for the off-equilibrium belief from T = 1 applies here as well,
the informed trader with good information wants to mimic the informed
trader with bad information in order to get a lower price. In addition, the off-
equilibrium belief implies after observing an off-equilibrium quantity B′1 in
T = 1, the uninformed trader, no matter whether observing an equilibrium
quantitiy BH2 /B
L
2 or off-equilibrium quantity B
′
2, the uninformed trader will
hold the off-equilibrium belief. I will have to show that the conditional beliefs
specified in 3.5 and 3.6 satisfy incentive compatibility of the informed trader
and ensure participation of the uninformed trader in equilibrium.
The twice repeated dynamic game is solved by backward induction. Con-
sider first, period T = 2.
Period T = 2 In t = 2, the uninformed trader infers the private infor-
mation ω from the demand Bω2 of the informed trader. As price taker, the
5The off-equilibrium beliefs stipulated here are not the only possible ones.
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uninformed trader decides whether to sell or to retain the assets for a given
price Pω2 . If the uninformed trader retains the assets, he has a holding of
assets of E−Bω1 . The equilibrium price therefore has to satisfy the following
participation constraint:
q2WH2+(1− q2)WL2 ≥ q2(δU2VH(E −BH1 )) + (1− q2)(δU2VL(E −BL1 ))
(3.7)
with Wω2 = P
ω
2 B
ω
2 + δU2(E −Bω1 −Bω2 )Vω.
Due to perfect competition, the uninformed trader breaks even. Then, the
equilibrium price is Pω2 = δU2Vω, depending on the demand observed. It
is intuitive that the uninformed trader wants to sell the asset at the price
which reflects the value of the firm discounted by his liquidity need. The
more liquidity constrained the uninformed trader, the more he is willing to
decrease the price. These are the two components of the price, the informa-
tion component and the liquidity component.
In t = 1, the informed trader is willing to buy the risky asset if the NPV
of buying the risky asset outweighs the NPV of the riskless asset. Given
the price Pω2 , the informed trader’s participation constraint, depending on
private information, is
−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2Vω(Bω1 +Bω2 ) ≥ δI2VωBω1 . (3.8)
No matter which information the informed trader observed, the participa-
tion constraint is satisfied if δI2 ≥ δU2. Since the uninformed trader can
observe the quality of the investment, the only gain from trade stems from
the asymmetry in liquidity needs, the liquidity wedge. Intuitively, the un-
informed trader wants to sell assets because he needs liquidity. Given his
tight liquidity needs, the uninformed trader is willing to reduce the price
below its informational value. As long as the informed trader is less liquid-
ity constrained, the price of the asset is relatively cheap with respect to its
prospective.
In order to show that Bω2 is the optimal choice for the informed trader
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given the observed information ω, consider the incentive compatibility con-
straints. As shown before, the informed trader faces a price Pω2 = δU2Vω
when choosing Bω2 . First, I show that neither type wants to mimic the other
type:
(−δU2+δI2)VωBω2 ≥ (−δU2V−ω + δI2Vω)B−ω2 (3.9)
with ω 6= −ω.
Notice that in the latter inequality, δI2VωB
ω
1 enters both sides and hence
cancels each other out. It enters also the right hand side because at T = 2
the choice of T = 1 cannot be altered any more.
For both types ω, condition 3.9 is satisfied if
(δI2 − δU2)VH
δI2VH − δU2VLB
H
2 ≥ BL2 ≥ max
{
0,
δI2VL − δU2VH
(δI2 − δU2)VL B
H
2
}
. (3.10)
The upper limit ensures incentive compatibility for the informed trader
who observed H and the lower limit ensures incentive compatibility for the
informed trader with bad information L. Notice, δI2VL−δU2VH(δI2−δU2)VL B
H
2 > 0 if
δI2 > δU2
VH
VL
. Furthermore, observe 1 > (δI2−δU2)VHδI2VH−δU2VL >
δI2VL−δU2VH
(δI2−δU2)VL . This
implies that BH2 > B
L
2 , meaning that the informed trader with good infor-
mation H has to buy more than the informed trader with information L for
a separating equilibrium to exist.
Besides choosing Bω2 , the informed trader with private information ω can
also choose any other quantity, i.e. a quantity B′2 which satisfies B′2 6= Bω2
and B′2 6= B−ω2 . After observing B′2 and the beliefs as specified in 3.6, the
uninformed trader believes to face a trader with good information. Then
from the uninformed trader’s participation constraint the off-equilibrium
price is P ′2 = δU2VH . In order to ensure optimality of Bω2 consider the
following incentive compatibility constraint for each state ω:
(−δU2 + δI2)VωBω2 ≥ −P ′2B′2 + δI2VωB′2 ∀ B′2. (3.11)
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Bω2 is indeed optimal if
BH2 = max{B′2} and (3.12)
BL2 ≥ max
{
0,
δI2VL − δU2VH
(δI2 − δU2)VL max{B
′
2}
}
(3.13)
with max{B′2} = E −Bω1 .
Conditions 3.10 and 3.13 combined yield
(δI2 − δU2)VH
δI2VH − δU2VL (E −B
H
1 ) ≥ BL2 ≥ max{0,
δI2VL − δU2VH
(δI2 − δU2)VL (E −min{B
L
1 , B
H
1 })}
(3.14)
Period T = 1 Period T = 1 has the same structure as T = 2, i.e. in
t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the informed trader’s demand Bω1
and decides whether to sell at a given price Pω1 or retain the assets and in
t = 1, the informed trader decides whether to purchase Bω1 units of the risky
asset or the riskless asset. In T = 1 however, traders take into account their
actions from T = 2.
In t = 2, the uninformed trader infers the private information ω from
the demand Bω1 of the informed trader. As price taker, the uninformed
trader decides whether to sell or to retain the assets for a given price Pω1 .
The equilibrium price therefore has to satisfy the following participation
constraint:
q1WH1+(1− q1)WL1 ≥ q1OH1 + (1− q1)OL1 (3.15)
with Wω1 = P
ω
1 B
ω
1 + δU1(P
ω
2 B
ω
2 + δU2(E −Bω1 −Bω2 )Vω),
Oω1 = δU1(P
ω
2 B
ω
2 + δU2(E −Bω2 )Vω)
and Pω2 = δU2Vω.
Due to perfect competition, the uninformed trader breaks even. Then, the
equilibrium price is Pω1 = δU1δU2Vω, depending on the demand observed.
In t = 1, the informed trader is willing to buy the risky asset if the NPV
of buying the risky asset outweighs the NPV of the riskless asset. Given the
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prices Pω1 and P
ω
2 , the informed trader’s participation constraint, depending
on private information, is
−Pω1 Bω1 + δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2(Bω1 +Bω2 )Vω) ≥ δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2Bω2 Vω).
(3.16)
With Pω2 = δU2Vω and P
ω
1 = δU1δU2Vω, condition 3.16 yields
δI1δI2 ≥ δU1δU2. (3.17)
I have to demonstrate now, that Bω1 is the optimal choice. First, I show
that each type ω of informed trader does not want to mimic the other type
−ω 6= ω. Write the informed traders’ incentive compatibility constraints as:
− Pω1 Bω1 + δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2(Bω1 +Bω2 )Vω) ≥
− P−ω1 B−ω1 + δI1(−P−ω2 B−ω2 + δI2(B−ω1 +B−ω2 )Vω) (3.18)
According to the beliefs specified in 3.5 and 3.6, the informed trader can
only mimic the other type in T = 1 if he has already done so in T = 2.
The following is a sufficient condition for incentive compatibility as in
inequality 3.18
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VH
(−δU1δU2VL + δI1δI2VH)B
H
1 ≥ BL1 ≥ max{0,
(−δU1δU2VH + δI1δI2VL)
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VL B
H
1 }.
(3.19)
The proof is relegated to appendix C.1. The upper bound ensures incen-
tive compatibility of the high type and the lower bound ensures incentive
compatibility of the low type. Since 1 > (−δU1δU2+δI1δI2)VH(−δU1δU2VL+δI1δI2VH) , B
L
1 < B
H
1 .
Next, I have to show that either informed type does not want to choose
any other quantity B′1 6= Bω1 .
− Pω1 Bω1 + δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2(Bω1 +Bω2 )Vω) ≥
− P ′1B′1 + δI1(−P ′2B′2 + δI2(B′1 +B′2)Vω) (3.20)
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With beliefs as specified in 3.5 and 3.6, it is clear that if the informed trader
chooses any quantity different from Bω1 , the uninformed trader will believe
he is facing the high type.
In appendix C.2, it is shown that the optimality condition 3.20 is satisfied
if
BH1 ≥ B′1 (3.21)
BL1 ≥ max{0,
δI1δI2VL − δU1δU2VH
(δI1δI2 − δU1δU2)VL B
′
1} (3.22)
Inequality 3.21 yields BH1 = E. With B
H
1 = E and conditions 3.19 and 3.22,
BL has to satisfy
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VH
(−δU1δU2VL + δI1δI2VH)E ≥ B
L
1 ≥ max{0,
(−δU1δU2VH + δI1δI2VL)
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VL E}
We can now state existence of a separating equilibrium.
Proposition 8. Separating Equilibrium. There exists a separating equilib-
rium with trade in period T = 1 only, BH1 = E and B
L
1 =
(−δU1δU2+δI1δI2)VH
(−δU1δU2VL+δI1δI2VH)E,
since δI1 > δU1 and δI2 > δU2. Prices are P
ω
1 = δU1δU2Vω.
The proof is straightforward. Given that the informed trader with good
information buys all assets in T = 1, BH1 = E, the optimality condition
for the high type in T = 2, BH2 = E − Bω1 = 0. By the same token, the
optimality condition for the low type yields, 0 ≥ BL2 . This completes the
proof.
That trade takes only place in period T = 1 stems from the fact that,
from the perspective of T = 1, the informed trader faces a lower price in
T = 1 than in T = 2. Observe from the left-hand side of inequality 3.20 the
price in T = 1 is Pω1 = δU1δU2Vω and the price in T = 2 is δI1P
ω
2 = δI1δU2Vω.
Since δI1 > δU1, the price in T = 1 is lower than the price in T = 2. At the
same time the uninformed trader is indifferent between selling everything in
the first period and selling everything in two periods.
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3.3.2 Pooling equilibrium
Next, I characterize the conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists.
In a pooling equilibrium, the informed trader buys identical quantities in
either state ω. Therefore, the uninformed trader cannot infer the informed
trader’s private information. Suppose the informed trader, in period T ,
chooses BPT in either state, then the uninformed trader’s and the firm’s
conditional belief is equal to their priors. If they observe and B′T 6= BPT , their
conditional belief implies that the informed trader has good information:
q1 = Pr(H|B1) =
β if B1 = BP11 if B1 = B′1 . (3.23)
The intuition for the belief off-equilibrium6 is, that the informed trader with
good information is more inclined to deviate from the equilibrium quantity
BPT since the price in the pooling equilibrium is relatively low.
In T = 2, the uninformed trader’s beliefs depend on the trades observed
in both periods. I.e. both types of informed trader ω have to buy BP1 and
BP2 for the uninformed trader not to be able to infer private information:
q2 = Pr(H|B2) =
β if B2 = BP2 ∧ B1 = BP11 otherwise. (3.24)
The off-equilibrium belief implies, after observing an off-equilibrium quan-
tity B′1 in T = 1, the uninformed trader, no matter whether observing the
equilibrium quantitiy BP2 or off-equilibrium quantity B
′
2, the uninformed
trader will hold the off-equilibrium belief. I will have to show that the con-
ditional beliefs specified in 3.23 and 3.24 satisfy incentive compatibility of
the informed trader and ensure participation of the uninformed trader in
equilibrium.
The twice repeated dynamic game is solved by backward induction. Con-
sider first, period T = 2.
6The off-equilibrium beliefs stipulated here are not the only possible ones.
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Period T = 2 In t = 2, after observing the informed trader’s demand
BP2 , the uninformed trader forms the beliefs given in equation 3.24. Then
he decides whether to sell or to keep the asset. Since the informed trader
purchases the same quantity BP2 regardless of the state, there is just one
price P2 for both states. The uninformed trader’s participation constraint
becomes
q2WH2 + (1− q2)WL2 ≥ q2(δU2VH(E −BP1 )) + (1− q2)(δU2VL(E −BP1 ))
(3.25)
with Wω2 = P2B
P
2 + δU2(E −BP1 −BP2 )Vω.
Recall, the uninformed trader is price taker and in competition for the sale
with the other small, uninformed traders. The equilibrium price P2 has
to satisfy inequality 3.25 when it is binding, i.e. the uninformed trader
breaks even. If inequality 3.25 is binding, P2 = δU2E(V ) with E(V ) =
βVH + (1− β)VL.
Just like in the separating equilibrium, the price decreases the more
liquidity constrained the uninformed trader. For a given δU2 and β > 0, the
equilibrium price in the pooling equilibrium lays between the prices in the
separating equilibrium in the good state and in the bad state, PH2 > P2 >
PL2 .
In t = 1, the informed trader is willing to buy the risky asset if the NPV
of buying the risky asset outweighs the NPV of the riskless asset. Given
the price P2, the informed trader’s participation constraint, depending on
private information, is
−P2BP2 + δI2Vω(BP1 +BP2 ) ≥ δI2VωBP1 . (3.26)
The participation constraint of the informed trader with bad information L,
is more difficult to satisfy. The informed trader’s participation is therefore
ensured if δI2 ≥ δU2E(V )VL . Since
E(V )
VL
> 1, the informed trader needs to
be considerably less liquidity constrained than the uninformed trader, and
in particular less than in the separating equilibrium where participation in
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T = 2 was ensured if δI2 > δU2. Observe that
E(V )
VL
increases in β. That
is the more likely the good outcome, the larger needs to be the difference
between the informed trader’s liquidity needs and the uninformed trader’s
liquidity needs.
It is the inequality δI2 ≥ δU2E(V )VL which drives non-information revela-
tion. The fact that E(V )VL > 1 is due to the non-linear equilibrium beliefs.
The intuition is, the uninformed trader has to be so liquidity constrained
that the price decrease outweighs the low prospect of the uninformed trader
with bad information.
In order to show that BP2 is the optimal choice for the informed trader
given the observed information ω and beliefs 3.24, consider the incentive
compatibility constraints. As shown before, the informed trader faces a
price P2 = δU2E(V ) when choosing B
P
2 . Then the incentive compatibility
constraints become:
(−δU2E(V ) + δI2Vω)BP2 ≥ (−δU2VH + δI2Vω)B′2. (3.27)
Notice that in the latter inequality, δI2VωB
P
1 enters both sides and hence
cancels each other out. It enters also the right hand side because at T = 2
the choice of T = 1 cannot be altered any more.
I find that informed trader with good information has a more binding
incentive compatibility constraint which is satisfied if
BP2 ≥
(δI2 − δU2)VH
δI2VH − δU2E(V )B
′
2 (3.28)
with B′2 = E −BP1
Since 1 > (δI2−δU2)VHδI2VH−δU2E(V ) , inequality 3.28 is satisfied ∀ B′2 if BP2 = E −BP1 .
I hereby have described a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in T = 2 in
which private information is not revealed. I proceed to describe the pooling
equilibrium of T = 1.
Period T = 1 Period T = 1 has the same structure as T = 2, i.e. in
t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the informed trader’s demand BP1
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and decides whether to sell at a given price P1 or retain the assets and in
t = 1, the informed trader decides whether to purchase BP1 units of the risky
asset or the riskless asset. In T = 1 however, traders take into account their
actions from T = 2.
In t = 2, the uninformed trader observes the uninformative demand BP1
and decides whether to sell or to retain the assets for a given price P1.
The equilibrium price therefore has to satisfy the following participation
constraint:
q1WH1 + (1− q1)WL1 ≥ q1OH1 + (1− q1)OL1 (3.29)
with Wω1 = P1B
P
1 + δU1(P2B
P
2 + δU2(E −BP1 −BP2 )Vω)
and Oω1 = (δU1(P2B
P
2 + δU2(E −BP2 )Vω)).
With P2 = δU2E(V ) and perfect competition among uninformed traders,
P1 = δU1δU2E(V ).
Solving backwards, in t = 1, the informed trader is willing to buy the
risky asset if the NPV of buying the risky asset outweighs the NPV of the
riskless asset. Given the prices P1 and P2, and the uninformed trader’s
beliefs q1 as specified in 3.23, the informed trader’s participation constraint,
depending on private information, is
−P1BP1 + δI1(−P2BP2 + δI2(BP1 +BP2 )Vω) ≥ δI1(−P2BP2 + δI2BP2 Vω).
(3.30)
After simplifying inequality 3.30 for both types ω, it is clear that the in-
formed trader with bad information is less willing to participate. He partic-
ipates only if
δI1δI2 ≥ δU1δU2E(V )
VL
. (3.31)
I have to demonstrate now, that BP1 is the optimal choice. Write I’s ICs
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as:
−P1BP1 + δI1(−P2BP2 + δI2(BP1 +BP2 )Vω) ≥ −P ′1B′1 + δI1(−P ′2B′2 + δI2(B′1 +B′2)Vω)
In accordance with the beliefs specified in 3.23 and 3.24, once the informed
trader deviated from the equilibrium quantity BP1 , the uninformed trader
believes to face the high type ever after. The demonstration of incentive
compatibility in T = 1 is relegated to appendix C.3.
I can readily state the following proposition now.
Proposition 9. Pooling Equilibrium. There exists a pooling equilibrium
with trade in T = 1 only, with price P1 = δU1δU2E(V ) and trade B
P
2 = E
since δI1 > δU1 and δI2 > δU2
The intuition for trade in T = 1 only is analogous to the one in the
separating equilibrium. From the perspective of T = 1, the informed trader
faces a lower price for T = 1 than for T = 2. Since he knows with certainty
the asset’s payoff, he is facing no risk from holding the asset. Observe that
the price does not reveal information.
This provides a contrasting example to the literature (Kyle (1985), Back
and Baruch (2004) and Ostrovsky (2012)) which finds that it is optimal to
trade in every period such that in the limit information is revealed.
3.4 Discussion
Trade in one period only may be a specifity of linear payoffs and asymmetric
liquidity needs. Linear payoffs naturally yield corner solutions. In the model
in the previous sections, one possible critique could be, the informed trader
buys all assets in the first period such that he cannot buy any more assets
in the second period7. In addition, the price in the first period is lower
than in the second, which is driven by the asymmetric liquidity needs, and
7This is true for both separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium. In the separating
equilibrium however, the informed trader with good information buys all assets in the first
period. Through incentive compatibility constraints, this causes the informed trader with
bad information not to buy anything in the second period neither.
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hence there is only trade in the first period. In order to show that the of
trade in one period only is not an artifact of the assumptions, I have to vary
the assumptions in question. Namely, I could change the trade motive from
liquidity asymmetry to risk-sharing. Then, the informed trader buys assets
from the uninformed trader because the uninformed trader is more risk-
averse. Risk-aversion is not only a different trade motive but also generates
non-linear utility functions and thus interior solutions. The introduction of
risk-aversion would allow to address both issues, i.e. linear preferences and
a trade motive favoring early trade.
Even if trade in every period is restored with risk-aversion, it is not obvi-
ous why the pooling equilibrium, i.e. no information revelation, should van-
ish if trade is repeated finitely. This would still prove a counter-example to
the literature (Kyle (1985), Back and Baruch (2004) and Ostrovsky (2012))
in which information is always revealed.
3.5 Conclusion
Models in which a monopolistically informed trader buys assets from noise
traders through competitive market makers over finitely many periods, yield
that it is optimal to trade in every period and that the price reveals private
information.
By introducing rational, liquidity constrained traders instead of noise
traders, I can provide a simple two period example, in which it is optimal
to trade in the first period only. Moreover, there exist equilibria in which
private information is not revealed.
Whether the one-period-trade-only result is robust to different prefer-
ences of the uninformed trader remains a task for future research.
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Appendix A
Efficient Asset Trade - A
Model with Asymmetric
Information and Asymmetric
Liquidity Needs
A.1 Conditions for the ranking of liquidity thresh-
olds
If VH > 2VL
1 >
VL
VH − VL >
V 2L
(VH − VL)2 >
V 2L
VH(VH − VL) ,
if 2VL > VH >
1
2
(1 +
√
5)VL
V 2L
(VH − VL)2 >
VL
VH − VL > 1 >
V 2L
VH(VH − VL) and
if
1
2
(1 +
√
5)VL > VH > VL
V 2L
(VH − VL)2 >
VL
VH − VL >
V 2L
VH(VH − VL) > 1.
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These conditions allow to rank the thresholds on the liquidity difference.
Given 1 > β > 0,
for any
VL
VH − VL > β >
V 2L
(VH − VL)2 ,
FP
FLP
>
FH − FP
FH − FHP
>
FH − FL
FH − F ′H
,
for any min{ VL
VH − VL ,
V 2L
(VH − VL)2 } > β >
V 2L
VH(VH − VL) ,
FH − FP
FH − FHP
>
FP
FLP
>
FH − FL
FH − F ′H
and
for any
V 2L
VH(VH − VL) > β,
FH − FP
FH − FHP
>
FH − FL
FH − F ′H
>
FP
FLP
.
A.2 Proof of proposition 3
Using the terms for FH , FL, F
H
P and F
L
P , the welfare comparison of inequal-
ity 1.30 can be rewritten as
∆W =
(1− β)(βδIE(VH − VL)2 + (δI − δU )(BL − E)V 2L )
2c
> 0
⇒ (δI(β(VH − VL)2 − V 2L ) + δUV 2L )E + (δI − δU )V 2LBL > 0
If (δI(β(VH − VL)2 − V 2L ) + δUV 2L ) ≥ 0, BL can be as small as 0. Recall,
welfare of separating equilibrium and pooling equilibrium is compared for
a parameter space such that both types of equilibria exist: δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H >
δI > δU
FP
FLP
, δU <
FLP
FP
and, β < min{1, V 2LVH(VH−VL)}. Together with these
conditions, (δI(β(VH − VL)2 − V 2L ) + δUV 2L ) ≥ 0 if the following conditions
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are simultaneously satisfied
δI < δU
V 2L
V 2L − β(VH − VL)2
,
β >
3VL − VH
(VH − VL)2 and
VH > (1 +
√
2)VL
Otherwise, BL has to be strictly larger than 0. In the following, a such
BL is derived. Observe, that with VH = VL, the pooling equilibrium yields
greater welfare for any E > BL ≥ 0. Therefore, I characterize a BL(VH),
that yields a non-negative difference WS −WP for any VH , given VL. Con-
jecture, the larger VH , the smaller can be B
L. A change in VH affects the
welfare difference
∂∆W
∂VH
=
(1− β)(2βδIE(VH − VL)2 + (δI − δU )∂B
L(VH)
∂VH
V 2L )
2c
In order to derive the conditions for which ∆W > 0, I study the minimum
of ∆W . A candidate minimum of ∆W will have to satisfy ∂∆W∂VH = 0 and
∂2∆W
∂V 2H
≥ 0. From the necessary condition, an ordinary differential equation
is obtained
∂BL(VH)
∂VH
= −2βδI(VH − VL)
(δI − δU )V 2L
E
The function for BL(VH) satisfying the necessary condition is B
L(VH) =
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
E. In order for BL(VH) > 0, VH < 2VL. From the existence
condition of the separating equilibrium, (δI−δU )FH
δIF
′
H−δUFLE > B
L. In order to
show that there exists a BL > 0 satisfying both the existence condition of the
separating equilibrium and the minimum condition of the welfare difference,
(δI−δU )FH
δIF
′
H−δUFL >
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
. This is satisfied for 2VL > VH > VL.
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The sufficient condition for a minimum to exist is
∂2∆W
∂V 2H
=
(1− β)(2βδIE + (δI − δU )∂
2BL(VH)
∂V 2H
V 2L )
2c
For BL(VH) =
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
E, the sufficient condition equals 0. The can-
didate minimum is hence local.
With BL(VH),
∆W =
(1− β)(δU − (1− β)δI)V 2L
2c
E
∆W > 0 if and only if 11−β δU > δI . Recall from the existence condi-
tions, δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FP
FLP
. For a 1 > δI > 0 which satisfies
1
1−β δU > δI
and δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > δU
FP
FLP
, 11−β >
FP
FLP
. The latter condition is satisfied
if 2VH−3VLVH−VL < β. For the pooling equilibrium and the separating equilib-
rium to exist for the same δI , β <
V 2L
VH(VH−VL) . There exists a 1 > β > 0
which satisfies 2VH−3VLVH−VL < β <
V 2L
VH(VH−VL) for either
3
2VL > VH > VL or
2VL > VH >
1
4(3 +
√
17)VL. This completes the characterization of the con-
ditions under which the separating equilibrium yields greater welfare than
the pooling equilibrium.
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Appendix B
(In)efficient asset trade and a
rationale for a Tobin Tax
B.1 Proof of proposition 7
Using the terms for FH , FL, F
H
P and F
L
P , the welfare comparison of inequal-
ity 2.25 can be rewritten as
∆W =
(1− β)(βδIE(VH − VL)2 + (δI − δU )(BL − E)V 2L )
2c
> 0
⇒ (δI(β(VH − VL)2 − V 2L ) + δUV 2L )E + (δI − δU )V 2LBL > 0
Recall that δU
FH−FL
FH−F ′H > δI > max{δU
FP
FLP
, δU
FH
F ′L
} and that δU FPFLP >
δI
1+τ >
max{δU , δU FHF ′L }. The last inequality can be rewritten in terms of the tax τ ,
δI
δU
− 1 > τ > δIδU
FLP
FP
− 1 if VH < 2VL.
Consider ∆W = (δI(β(VH − VL)2 − V 2L ) + δUV 2L )E + (δI − δU )V 2LBL.
If (δI(β(VH−VL)2−V 2L )+δUV 2L ) ≥ 0, BL can be as small as 0. (δI(β(VH−
VL)
2−V 2L )+δUV 2L ) ≥ 0 if δI < δU V
2
L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
. For a separating equilibrium
to exist, δI > δU (1+τ) if VH < 2VL. For 1 > δI > 0, δU
V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
> δI >
δU (1+τ). The condition on δI is satisfied if τ <
V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
−1. From the
existence condition of the separating equilibrium, τ > δIδU
FLP
FP
− 1. In order
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for a positive τ to exist,
V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
− 1 > δIδU
FLP
FP
− 1. This is satisfied
for δI < δU
FP
FLP
V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
. The latter condition does not violate the co-
existance condition δI > δU
FP
FLP
. Therefore, there exist a Pareto improving
tax min{ V 2L
V 2L−β(VH−VL)2
− 1, δIδU − 1} > τ >
δI
δU
FLP
FP
− 1 if
min{δU FP
FLP
V 2L
V 2L − β(VH − VL)2
, δU
FH − FL
FH − F ′H
} > δI > δU FP
FLP
. (B.1)
Otherwise, BL has to be strictly larger than 0. In the following, a such
BL is derived.Therefore, I characterize a BL(VH), that yields a non-negative
difference WS −WP for any VH , given VL. Conjecture, the larger VH , the
smaller can be BL. A change in VH affects the welfare difference
∂∆W
∂VH
=
(1− β)(2βδIE(VH − VL)2 + (δI − δU )∂B
L(VH)
∂VH
V 2L )
2c
In order to derive the conditions for which ∆W > 0, I study the minimum
of ∆W . A candidate minimum of ∆W will have to satisfy ∂∆W∂VH = 0 and
∂2∆W
∂V 2H
≥ 0. From the necessary condition, an ordinary differential equation
is obtained
∂BL(VH)
∂VH
= −2βδI(VH − VL)
(δI − δU )V 2L
E
The function for BL(VH) satisfying the necessary condition is B
L(VH) =
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
E. In order for BL(VH) > 0, VH < 2VL. From the existence
condition of the separating equilibrium, (δI−(1+τ)δU )FH
δIF
′
H−(1+τ)δUFLE > B
L. In order to
show that there exists a BL > 0 satisfying both the existence condition of the
separating equilibrium and the minimum condition of the welfare difference,
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(δI−(1+τ)δU )FH
δIF
′
H−(1+τ)δUFL >
2βδI(VHVL−V
2
H
2
)
(δI−δU )V 2L
. The latter inequality is satisfied if
VH < 2VL, (B.2)
δI > δU (1 + τ) ↔ δI
δU
− 1 > τ and (B.3)
δI
δU
VH
VL
− 1 > τ (B.4)
δI
δU
− 1 > τ conicides with the existence condition and is hence always sat-
isfied. Since δIδU
VH
VL
> δIδU , condition B.4 is satisfied as well.
With BL(VH),
∆W =
(1− β)(δU − (1− β)δI)V 2L
2c
E (B.5)
∆W > 0 if (δU − (1 − β)δI) > 0, i.e. δU1−β > δI . Remains to be shown that
there exists a positive δI which satisfied both the non-negativity condition
of ∆W and the existence condition of the separating equilibrium: δU1−β > δI .
This condition poses restrictions on (i) δU1−β > δI > δU (1+ τ) if τ <
β
1−β and
(ii) δU1−β > δI > δU
FP
FLP
. 11−β >
FP
FLP
if β > 2VH−3VLVH−VL .
There exists a Pareto improving tax min{ δIδU − 1,
β
1−β} > τ > 0, if
BL =
2βδI(VHVL − V
2
H
2 )
(δI − δU )V 2L
E, (B.6)
2VL > VH > VL, (B.7)
δU
1− β > δI > δU
FP
FLP
and (B.8)
β >
2VH − 3VL
VH − VL . (B.9)
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Appendix C
Optimal Timing of Asset
Purchases
C.1 Incentive Compatibility in the separating equi-
librium in T=1
This is to show incentive compatibility in the separating equilibrium in pe-
riod T = 1. I have to demonstrate now, that Bω1 is the optimal choice.
First, I show that each type ω of informed trader does not want to mimic
the other type −ω 6= ω. Write I’s ICs as:
−Pω1 Bω1 + δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2(Bω1 +Bω2 )Vω) ≥ −P−ω1 B−ω1 + δI1(−P−ω2 B−ω2 + δI2(B−ω1 +B−ω2 )Vω)
With Pω1 = δU1δU2Vω, P
ω
2 = δU2Vω, P
−ω
1 = δU1δU2V−ω and P
−ω
2 = δU2V−ω.
Rewrite the ICs as follows:
− Pω1 Bω1 + δI1δI2Bω1 Vω ≥ −P−ω1 B−ω1 + δI1δI2B−ω1 Vω
+ δI1(−P−ω2 B−ω2 + δI2B−ω2 Vω − (−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2Bω2 Vω))
The second line is the negative IC in T = 2 and hence non-positive by
75
construction. The first line is satisfied if
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VH
(−δU1δU2VL + δI1δI2VH)B
H
1 ≥ BL1 ≥ max{0,
(−δU1δU2VH + δI1δI2VL)
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VL B
H
1 }
This is a sufficient condition for the ICs to be satisfied in T = 1
C.2 Optimality in the separating equilibrium in
T=1
In order to show that either informed type does not want to choose any
other quantity B′1 6= Bω1 .
−Pω1 Bω1 + δI1(−Pω2 Bω2 + δI2(Bω1 +Bω2 )Vω) ≥ −P ′1B′1 + δI1(−P ′2B′2 + δI2(B′1 +B′2)Vω)
With Pω1 = δU1δU2Vω, P
ω
2 = δU2Vω, P
′
1 = δU1δU2VH and P
′
2 = δU2VH .
Rewrite the ICs as
− Pω1 Bω1 + δI1δI2Bω1 Vω ≥ −P ′1B′1 + δI1δI2B′1Vω
+ δI1(−P ′2B′2 + δI2B′2Vω − (−P ′2B′2 + δI2B′2Vω))
The second line is satisfied the IC in T = 2 and at most zero. Therefore
it suffices that
BH1 ≥ B′1 BH1 = E
BL1 ≥ max{0,
δI1δI2VL − δU1δU2VH
(δI1δI2 − δU1δU2)VL B
′
1} with B′1 = E
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VH
(−δU1δU2VL + δI1δI2VH)E ≥ B
L
1 ≥ max{0,
(−δU1δU2VH + δI1δI2VL)
(−δU1δU2 + δI1δI2)VL E}
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C.3 Incentive Compatibility in the pooling equi-
librium in T=1
This can be rewritten as
−P1BP1 + δI1δI2BP1 Vω ≥ −P ′1B′1 + δI1δI2B′1Vω
+δI1(−P ′2B′2 + δI2B′2Vω − (−P2BP2 + δI2BP2 Vω))
From T = 2, we know that the second line is more binding for the H-type
and negative by construction. The first line is again more binding for the
H-type. There is no profitable deviation for the informed trader if BP1 = E.
This implies that the informed trader wants to buy everything in the first
period and nothing in the second period.
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